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ABSTRACT
 This project investigates how identities, self-sentiments, and personal network 
composition impact political polarization. I apply the framework of Affect Control 
Theory to capture how Democrats and Republicans feel about their political ingroup and 
outgroups (through evaluation, potency and activity ratings) and evaluate the likelihood 
of events involving these groups. In my first experiment, I study if self-uncertainty and 
self-affirmation primes impact political bias. I also apply Affect Control Theory-Self to 
measure self-sentiment change (self-evaluation, self-potency, and self-activity) from 
these primes as well. I predict that priming self-uncertainty should increase political bias 
(due to inflated self-sentiments) and that priming self-affirmation should decrease 
political bias (due to inflating self-sentiments). My results show that there is strong 
political bias in both Democrats and Republicans with each group rating their outgroup 
lower on EPA. When analyzing if psychological primes could influence this baseline 
bias, I find that self-uncertainty increased negative evaluations towards one’s political 
outgroup. Finally, I found that I could detect self-sentiment change on the self-evaluation 
dimension from these psychological primes. Thus, Affect Control Theory could capture 
political polarization, self-sentiment change from psychological primes, and these primes 
did have an impact on political bias.  
My second study analyzed how personal network composition influenced political 
bias. I predicted that increased political homogeneity in one’s personal network would be 
associated with greater political bias (measured through feelings towards one’s outgroup, 
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subjective likelihood of events involving political groups, and strength of political 
ideology). Increased homogeneity was associated with decreased evaluation and potency 
of the outgroup as well as biased information processing for evaluating the likelihood of 
events involving the political groups. Additionally, greater homogeneity was associated 
with increased strength in political ideology, but only in Republicans. Finally, I found 
that evaluating one’s outgroup less negatively was associated with higher agreement with 
political beliefs associated with one’s outgroup. The results of this project demonstrate 
that self-sentiments and personal networks can influence political bias.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Do we process political information differently depending on how we feel about 
ourselves? Does who we associate with influence our processing of political information? These 
are the two main research questions of this dissertation. With political polarization growing 
rapidly in America, it is important for researchers to understand the social and psychological 
variables that influence political bias. Democrats and Republicans have steadily increased their 
dislike of each other over time and recent research shows that about 80% of partisans (committed 
members of a political party) dislike their political outgroup (Pew Research 2016). This strong 
partisan bias results in a heightened skepticism of information that is threatening to the ingroup 
(Clark et al 2019; Ditto et al 2017), thereby impeding efforts to undo this polarization.  The 
growth of political polarization in the United States has resulted in significant interest from 
social psychologists, who have studied both the psychological traits (such as self-esteem) and 
social factors (such as the people we interact with) that contribute to this phenomenon. However, 
both the psychological and sociological literatures on polarization have inconsistencies and gaps 
that may benefit from applying a common underlying theory that offers greater precision and a 
framework for evaluating the subjective likelihood of intergroup behavior. Uniting insights from 
psychological and sociological literatures can provide an enhanced understanding of intergroup 
relations, identities, and components that affect polarization.  
Unfortunately, much of the work on the self-sentiments that contribute to bias is 
conflicting because the literature often lacks a “common currency” that accounts for an  
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underlying explanatory mechanism (McGregor 2006). I argue that the formal structure and 
mathematical foundation of Affect Control Theory (ACT) will resolve some of these 
inconsistencies. Specifically, the methodology of ACT-self can better measure how self-
sentiments impact information processing related to politics. I argue that the variables in ACT 
(evaluation, potency, and activity as well as deflection) more rigorously capture the phenomenon 
that influences affective polarization as well.   
Additionally, I studied how those we associate with can mitigate or facilitate political 
bias. Sociologists typically measure an individual’s closest associates through ego networks, 
which focus on the surrounding network of one individual (Marin and Wellman 2011). There 
have been conflicting results on how ego networks impact political beliefs with some studies 
finding that exposure to political outgroups can increase polarization (Bail et al 2018) and others 
finding exposure to political outgroups can decrease polarization (Visser and Mirabile 2004) 
These studies have excluded several important variables such as with whom the participant 
discusses “important matters.” This can create an illusion that social exposure to conflicting 
worldviews does not reduce polarization, but I argue that the nature of the exposure does matter 
significantly.  
My dissertation studied how self-sentiments and personal networks contribute to political 
bias across two separate experiments. Both experiments conceptualized Democrats and 
Republicans as subcultures within an Affect Control Theory framework. The first study 
measured the psychological impact of increasing or decreasing self-sentiments. The goal was to 
assess whether priming self-affirmation (causing an increase in self-sentiments) reduces partisan 
bias compared to priming self-uncertainty (causing a decrease in self-sentiments) which was 
hypothesized to increase polarized attitudes. Self-sentiments were conceptualized as the degree 
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of goodness, potency, and activity people attribute to themselves. I used these experimental 
priming techniques to influence how people think about themselves, which in turn changed how 
open they were to identity challenging information (Sherman and Cohen 2006). I predicted that 
political groups should differ in their sentiments about the outgroup, but also on how they 
process the subjective likelihood of events involving political groups. This first study provides an 
important intersection between the self-priming and political identity literatures, and answers my 
first research question.   
The second study assessed how discussion networks also impact polarization while 
introducing key variables to close gaps in the existing literature. I obtained a detailed account of 
my participants’ ego networks via the “important matters” measure. This study reveals how 
homogeneity, when measured in a way that captures meaningful relationships, affects evaluation 
of political groups and subjective likelihood of intergroup behavior. Additionally, it analyzes 
how homogenous networks alter the emotions felt towards political groups, which in turn can 
impact political beliefs. This study answers my second research question. 
Chapter 2 covers the background on political polarization, self-sentiments, and how ACT 
provides a helpful theoretical bridge. Chapter 2 also provides a background on the literature on 
social networks and political beliefs, inconsistencies and gaps in that literature, and how the 
present study will account for those inconsistencies and gaps. Chapter 3 describes the methods 
and results of Study 1 (how does self-sentiment change impact political bias). Chapter 4 
describes the methods and results of Study 2 (how does network composition impact political 
bias). Chapter 5 provides a general discussion of Study 1 and Study 2’s findings while providing 
ideas for future research as well. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theoretical Background on Political Polarization 
Political polarization in the United States continues to rise to unprecedented levels 
(Iyengar et al 2018; Pew Research 2016). Democrats and Republicans have become more 
liberal and conservative respectively over time (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2; Pew Research 
Center 2017). Democrats and Republicans have also generated strong ingroup and 
outgroup identities, resulting in affective polarization, i.e., “the tendency of people 
identifying as Republicans or Democrats to view opposing partisans negatively and 
copartisans positively” (Iyengar & Westwood 2015 p. 691). Data from the American 
National Election Studies (Pew Research 2016) found a steady rise in Americans’ 
negative feelings towards their political outgroup over the past 50 years. In 1964, around 
30% of both Democrats and Republicans reported having negative feelings towards the 
opposing group. This negativity steadily rose over the decades and in 2012 nearly 80% of 
Democrats and Republicans had negative feelings towards their outgroup.  Such 
polarization goes beyond just cold feelings: in 2016 it was found that 45% of Republicans 
believed Democrats threatened the nation’s well-being and 41% of Democrats considered 
Republicans to be a threat (Pew Research 2016). Shockingly, Kalmoe and Mason (2019 
p.17) found that about 42% of both Democrats and Republicans agreed that the outgroup 
was “not just worse for politics – they are downright evil.” About 20% of Democrats and 
16% of Republicans in this study admitted thinking occasionally that the country would 
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be better if large numbers of the opposition died. 
 
Figure 2.1. Ideological polarization from Democrats and Republicans in 1994 via Pew 
Research Center. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Ideological polarization from Democrats and Republicans in 2017 via Pew 
Research Center. 
 
Affective polarization accounts for behaviors beyond reported dislike for the 
opposing political group in surveys or laboratory settings. Job resumes that signal an 
applicant’s political affiliation are more likely to get callbacks in areas aligned with their 
politics (Gift and Gift 2015). Employees are more willing to accept lower compensation 
if their employer shares their political identity (McConnell et al. 2018). Doctors also give 
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out different advice on political issues such as abortion and marijuana use depending on 
whether patients are Democrat or Republican (Hersh and Goldenberg 2016). 
Despite political groups having strong negative attitudes towards their opponents, 
partisans do not always display explicit prejudice against the outgroup because partisan 
ideologies are not solely based on distaste for the outgroup, suggesting that affective 
polarization is driven more by ingroup love than outgroup hate (Lelkes and Westwood 
2017). In Iyengar and colleagues’ (2018) review of affective polarization, they argued 
that future research should better delineate under what conditions ingroup favoritism or 
outgroup prejudice would occur. This question is important given the growing 
polarization in the political climate because political ingroups often view the same 
information quite differently than the outgroup.  
I argue that ingroup bias fundamentally changes how partisans view information. 
I predict bad behavior by ingroup members will be viewed as far less likely to occur, 
compared to outgroup members, as partisans will interpret the event differently 
depending on which political group engaged in the action. Identity Theory has offered a 
wealth of literature for explaining how partisans adhere to certain roles that shape their 
behavior (Burke and Stets 2009). However, I argue that the framework of Affect Control 
Theory (evaluation, potency, and activity as well as deflection) more rigorously captures 
the phenomenon that influences affective polarization. ACT offers an explicit framework 
that can test the subjective likelihood of intergroup behavior emergent from partisans’ 
interpretations of social events, provides a standardized metric for comparing American 
political subcultures to other subcultures, and offers a theoretical bridge to connect the 
two types of social psychologies that do similar work, but are often in academic silos.  
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Identity Theories and Political Groups 
Identity theories, including ACT, have been extremely useful for conceptualizing 
and studying the impact of political polarization because political scientists have 
consistently found that individuals think of political parties in terms of identity rather 
than a cumulation of attitudes about policy (Green, Palmquist, & Schickler 2004; Van 
Bavel & Pereira 2018). Consistent with these findings, Lelkes, Malka, and Bakker (2018, 
p.4) argue that partisans “desire to reach conclusions that are consistent with a valued 
identity.”  
Social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) suggests that once these political 
identities are formed, individuals will be motivated to protect their ingroup. Because 
party identities tend to be internalized, the group’s failures and victories can be 
experienced as personal ones (Huddy et al. 2015). This creates a motivation to support 
one’s ingroup and denigrate opposing groups (Mackie et al. 2009). Identities can also 
provide specific cultural expectations an individual is motivated to try and meet (Burke 
and Stets 2009).  For example, Democrats and Republicans both have strong, contrasting 
attitudes regarding gun control and abortion access (Pew Research 2017), and defending 
these values would certainly be part of their roles. Importantly, how well one performs in 
their role can impact their self-esteem (Stryker 1980). If an individual enacts their role as 
they believe they are supposed to, then they will feel good about themselves (Hoelter 
1986). Partisans may feel pressure to defend these values and act consistently with their 
political identities.  
Individuals are motivated to confirm their identities with behaviors consistent 
with their identity meanings (e.g. supporting their political ingroup) while also avoiding 
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the discomfort that comes with any information that disconfirms their identities (e.g. 
information that challenges their political ingroup). The more important an identity is to 
an individual, the more pressure they feel to enact behaviors consistent with the roles of 
their identity (Burke and Stets 2009). This finding is supported by research showing how 
both Democrats and Republicans were motivated to interpret information regarding 
abortion (Scurich, & Shniderman 2014) and gun control (Kahan et al 2017) in ways that 
support their political values. Unsworth and Fielding (2014) found that when they 
experimentally increased the identity salience of conservatives’ identity, they became 
more likely to reject the idea of anthropogenic climate change. Furthermore, even those 
scoring high on general science intelligence tests can reject the scientific consensus on 
issues when it conflicts with their political identities (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017; 
Kahan 2017). While Identity Theory can illustrate how political identities impact an 
individual’s behavior, I argue using the framework of Affect Control Theory offers three 
advantages in studying the social psychology of politics: variables of EPA and deflection 
that more rigorously capture the phenomenon that influences affective polarization, a 
method for predicting the subjective likelihood of specific ingroup and outgroup 
behaviors, and a connection to other subcultures from other cultural databases in order to 
contrast political sentiments across countries. 
Affect Control Theory 
Affect Control Theory (ACT) posits that individuals are motivated to maintain 
affective consistency between cultural meanings and social situations (Heise 2007). 
Instead of only focusing on specific identity meanings, ACT measures different 
components of social situations that can broadly include a variety of identities, behaviors, 
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and settings. The feelings an individual has about existing cultural information are called 
fundamental sentiments. The feeling that corresponds to the currently experienced social 
event is the transient impression. Discrepancies between the fundamental sentiments and 
transient impressions are called deflection. Deflection can also be easily related to the 
subjective likelihood of an event (and high deflection relates to a sense of unreality). 
Heise and MacKinnon (1987) found that subjective likelihood ratings and deflection 
scores have a significant and negative association. Individuals are motivated to avoid 
deflection and are assumed to do so using a feedback loop that processes the difference in 
their subjective rating of the preexisting fundamental sentiments compared to their 
transient impressions of unfolding events (Heise and MacKinnon 2010).  
ACT breaks down social situations into the individual components of actor, 
behavior, and object. Each of these components is then measured on the dimensions of 
evaluation (goodness vs. badness), potency (powerfulness vs. powerlessness), and 
activity (active vs. inactive), which have been found to have universal relevance in social 
processing across cultures (Osgood 1962). Together these three measures are known as 
EPA. EPA is measured using semantic differential scales which give a simple numerical 
input for each social component. Thus, ACT can measure all social elements on the same 
quantitative scales. This allows for deflection to have a mathematical definition, which is 
the Euclidean distance between the EPA values of the fundamental sentiments for and 
transient impressions of a particular social element (squaring is used to account for 
negative values). Heise (2007) was inspired by the impression change equations from 
Gollob (1974) and created his own equations to determine how meanings can change 
where they are placed in a larger social context. For example, a culture may have a 
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fundamental sentiment of the “mother” identity that is quite positive on the evaluation 
dimension. However, if we see a “mother” who is “hurting” a “child” then this could 
change how we evaluate the mother because they are behaving in a way that is 
inconsistent from the cultural meanings (assuming that “hurting” has a negative 
evaluation in this culture as well). The disconnection from the fundamental sentiment of a 
mother and the situation sentiment would result in a high amount of deflection, 
motivating us to reduce such deflection. Using our “mother” example, we may re-frame 
the “mother” into “monster” because a situation where a “monster” hurts a “child 
wouldcreate less affective inconsistency. We could also re-frame the behavior into 
something less negative such as “discipline” that may be more consistent with our 
fundamental sentiments for “mother.” When processing a highly deflecting event, we are 
more likely to reframe the behavior rather than the actor or object (Nelson 2006).  
Affect Control Theory and Political Groups 
ACT has been used to measure sentiment differences from a variety of 
subcultures including alcoholics (Thomassen 1992) and drug users (Thomas and Heise 
1995), religious denominations (Smith-Lovin & Douglass 1992), online communities 
(King 2008), college fraternities (Boyle and Walker 2016), and music fans (Hunt 2008). 
Generally, these studies predict that subcultures have more positive sentiments toward 
concepts related to their group and more negative sentiments toward concepts that 
challenge their group (Heise 2010). ACT also allows for these differences on sentiment 
ratings to predict the amount of deflection a group may experience. For example, Smith-
Lovin and Douglass (1992) collected EPA ratings on a variety of social elements for 
members of churches that were accepting versus unaccepting of homosexuals. As 
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expected, sentiments related to “gay person” were much more negative among members 
of the church that held negative views towards homosexuals. Similarly, the reported 
likelihood of a “gay person” engaging in a bad behavior was more likely to members of 
the anti-homosexual church as well. These findings successfully link the simulations of 
ACT’s deflection calculation to a real-world subculture.  
While ACT has been applied to social movements (Brit & Heise 2000; shuster & 
Campos-Castillo 2016), exploration of subcultural variation in sentiments has not been 
extended directly to American political groups. Researchers interested in political groups 
would benefit from applying ACT in their work (Troyer and Robinson 2006) because of 
the additional depth EPA ratings of concepts provide and how those ratings help predict 
the likelihood of intergroup behavior. Instead of only focusing on the evaluation 
dimension, ACT measures potency and activity as well, which offers a more 
comprehensive account for how threatening political groups are viewed. Furthermore, 
ACT’s deflection variable provides a single measure for the subjective likelihood of 
social events. Thus, deflection scores from political group members allows for ingroup 
favoritism and outgroup dislike to be captured on a single dimension of social event 
likelihood.  
Boyle and Meyer (2018) are one of the only studies to use EPA while studying 
modern American political groups, finding that subgroups who had greater representation 
of women in politics in their geographical area rated female Presidential candidates more 
positively. Eriksson and Funcke (2015) found that participants rate political outgroups as 
less warm, which largely overlaps with the evaluation dimension (Rogers, Schroder, and 
Scholl 2013). As noted above, subcultures tend to rate concepts related to their group 
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more positively and are more negative towards concepts that challenge their group (Heise 
2010). Furthermore, work by Crawford and colleagues (2015) found that both Democrats 
and Republicans rate their ingroup with higher competence, and competence has been 
found to relate to potency (Rogers, Schroder, and Scholl 2013). Warmth/goodness 
evaluations determine whether a group is friendly or hostile towards the goals of one’s 
ingroup. Competence/potency evaluations determine how capable a group is at carrying 
out its goals and influencing others (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick 2007). Republicans rate their 
ingroup even more competent compared to Democrats (Eriksson & Funcke 2015), but 
both political groups rate their ingroup as generally high warmth and high competence 
and their outgroup as low warmth and lower competence. However, Rogers and 
colleagues (2013) did not find a clear pattern of results for the role of activity for 
intergroup behaviors. Thus, evaluation and potency offer more depth beyond like/dislike 
measures of polarization while maintaining methodological rigor.  
Using ACT to detect differences in political groups can also allow researchers to 
predict how members of these subcultures will respond to social information. If 
respondents rate their political ingroup identities more positively than their political 
outgroups, then this will change how they assess the likelihood of social events involving 
these identities. For example, a Republican may react to the idea of a “Democrat” who 
“bullied” a “child” with a small amount of deflection because they may have negative 
views of a Democrat. However, a Democrat may rate that same social event as much less 
likely (i.e. a greater amount of deflecting) because they have a much more positive 
evaluation rating of Democrats, so Democrats engaging in a “bad” behavior would be 
viewed as less likely. This aligns with research by Smith-Lovin and Heise (1988) that 
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found a “consistency effect” between evaluation of the actor and their behavior. 
Individuals are especially motivated to maintain consistency between how positive they 
rate an actor and the behavior they engage in.  
Furthermore, individuals can also choose a less deflecting behavior to avoid 
affective inconsistency. Nelson (2006) had participants read high deflecting statements 
and then gave them a choice to change the actor, behavior, or object in the scenario. 
Participants overwhelmingly chose to change the behavior. When applied to politics, 
partisans may redefine the behavior in order to reduce the severity of poor behavior. This 
allows partisans to avoid challenging their pre-existing beliefs about the social world and 
questioning the goodness of their own political identity (e.g. Jost & van der Toorn 2012). 
For example, if a Republican heard an ingroup politician “lied” about their campaign, 
perhaps they would reframe “lie” into something less deflection-producing, such as 
“exaggerate.” Using ACT for studying political groups could delineate quantitatively 
how Democrats and Republicans contrast their evaluations of different social events 
without relying on verbal theory and implicit assumptions.1 Not only would ACT reveal 
precise subcultural differences on cultural sentiments, these ratings could help explain 
how each group processes the same social information with different levels of subjective 
likelihood. Deflection scores are negatively correlated with the perceived likelihood of 
 
1 Smith-Lovin and Robinson (2006) discuss how Identity Theory’s verbal format allows 
for a greater vulnerability of ambiguity and subsequent misunderstandings. Furthermore, 
the meanings of certain actions are often left implicit and the impact of social influence is 
not always specifically mapped out. Conversely, ACT involves affectively measuring the 
elements of a social situation from the perspective of an observer. The ratings are always 
on the same three dimensions of EPA, which makes it easy to compare across cultures. 
Finally, the affective inconsistency in ACT (i.e. deflection) can be mathematically 
calculated and even simulated.  
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different social events (Heise and MacKinnon 1987). Research has shown that ingroup 
bias often accounts for prejudice towards outgroups (Lelkes and Westwood 2017), but 
applying ACT allows researchers to assess how combinations of actors and object 
persons in the situation influence behavior and emotions (Rogers, Schroder, and Scholl 
2013). Thus, instead of trying to attribute when an event is more likely due to ingroup 
favoritism or outgroup dislike, the deflection framework provides both a more precise 
and parsimonious quantification of ingroup bias.  
Additionally, once a researcher obtains these subcultural data from Democrats 
and Republicans, they can be compared with other cultural databases with a standardized 
metric. Iyengar and colleagues (2018) note that there is an unfortunate schism between 
research on American politics and politics outside the United States. ACT’s framework 
can be easily applied across cultures and already has several international databases 
(Heise 2007; Heise 2010). Identity Theory’s focus on verbal theory increases specificity 
but lacks a framework that provides quantitative comparison across different identities. 
Using ACT as common sociocultural currency would allow future researchers to 
determine how bias among American political groups potentially differs from non-
American political groups. These questions are beyond the scope of the current project, 
but the data from the current studies can be used by future ACT researchers since the data 
employ the same standardized metrics. In addition to these benefits, ACT may also 
provide a rigorous framework for conceptualizing factors that influence political 
polarization as well.  How individuals feel about themselves (i.e. their self-integrity) has 
been shown to significantly influence how they process political information.  
15 
Finally, ACT offers a helpful bridge between experimental social psychology 
within psychology departments and Symbolic Interaction within sociology departments 
(Eagly and Fine 2010; Oishi, Kesbir, and Snyder 2009). Despite both fields having 
similar areas of focus, psychological social psychology and sociological social 
psychology rarely cite each other (as observed in the Thomson Reuter's Journal Citation 
Reports). ACT is a sociological theory that allows for mathematically modeling and 
experimentally testing how individuals process social events. This mathematical 
framework allows for the bridging of psychological social psychology concepts to be 
applied. In the next section, I describe how self-integrity primes (a concept largely found 
in psychology) 1) affect political bias and 2) can fit within and benefit from the ACT 
framework.  
Self-Integrity’s Impact on Political Polarization 
Affective polarization certainly impacts how one feels about their opposing 
political group; however, how individuals feel about themselves can influence how 
strongly they enact their identities. Just as ACT can offer several advantages for 
understanding how subculture impacts behavior, ACT’s rigorous framework and clearly 
defined variables can also better conceptualize the process of self-evaluations impacting 
behavior as well, as I will discuss towards the end of this section. Self-uncertainty and 
self-affirmation theory both can predict how self-evaluations affect how individuals 
process information. Individuals respond differently to political information depending 
on whether they feel uncertain or self-affirmed. Self-uncertainty and self-affirmation also 
appear to operate on the same compensatory mechanism, but their relationship is still not 
fully understood.  
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Both work in psychology (Hogg 2000; McGregor et al 2001) and sociology 
(Berger 1967; Facciani & Brashears 2019) describe how an individual’s group 
membership can help alleviate uncertainty. Strong adherence to a group can provide a 
framework of meaning to an individual (Hogg et al 2007). Group membership can reduce 
uncertainty because the beliefs associated with the group redirect attention away from 
uncertainty (McGregor, Nash, & Prentice, 2010) by focusing on their framework for 
understanding the world. While the members of Democrat and Republican groups are 
certainly not monolithic, there are still clear differences in beliefs and boundaries 
between each group.  Thus, because their identity provides a framework of meaning, 
individuals may adhere more closely to a political identity when facing uncertainty. 
Research by Hohman, Hogg, and Bligh (2010) confirmed this, showing that priming 
participants to feel uncertain made them align more strongly with their political identity. 
McGregor and colleagues (2001) found that priming uncertainty can also lead to stronger 
convictions on social issues such as capital punishment and abortion. A separate study 
found that both Democrats and Republicans thought their ingroup was more entitative 
(e.g. more distinct and defined by clear boundaries) when they were primed to feel 
uncertain (Sherman, Hogg, and Maitner 2009). These are important findings because they 
demonstrate that psychological factors (such as feeling uncertain) can impact how 
strongly one adheres to their political identity and the beliefs associated with it.  
Decreasing one’s self-evaluations through uncertainty can increase political bias, 
but research has also shown that increasing one’s self-evaluations can reduce political 
bias. Sherman and colleagues (2009) have used the concept of self-integrity to measure 
an individual’s self-evaluations. Self-integrity has been defined as the perception that an 
17 
individual is “adaptively and morally adequate, that is, … competent, good, coherent, 
unitary, stable, capable of free choice, capable of controlling important outcomes, and so 
on” (Steele, 1988, p. 267). Feeling uncertain would disrupt one’s self-integrity, but 
according to self-affirmation theory, individuals are motivated to constantly maintain 
their self-integrity (Sherman and Cohen 2014).  Thus, the meaning provided by one’s 
political identity can restore their self-integrity when they are feeling uncertain; by 
behaving as a good Democrat or a good Republican, individuals reaffirm their own 
underlying goodness and worth. Political group membership can reduce subjective 
uncertainty, and so can explain why individuals become deeply entrenched in their 
political groups (Hogg et al 2007). Once they are entrenched in their political groups, it 
could make them more susceptible to polarization.  
What happens when encountering new information makes individuals feel 
uncertain about their own political identity? According to the self-affirmation theory, 
information that makes one’s political ingroup look bad can be psychologically 
uncomfortable because it is threatening to a component of their self-integrity (Sherman et 
al 2009). Thus, individuals use motivated reasoning (allowing pre-existing beliefs to 
emotionally bias one’s judgements and conclusions) to ignore information that threatens 
their ingroup (Ditto et al 2017). However, if individuals use another source of self-
integrity when their ingroup is threatened, they may process the information more 
objectively (Sherman and Cohen 2014). Having participants think about a time they 
enacted an important value is one method of inducing self-integrity in a laboratory 
setting. For example, “family” may be an important value to an individual and thinking 
about a time they helped their children may serve as a boost to their self-integrity. 
18 
Thinking about times individuals enacted personally important values are acts of self-
affirmation.  
Studies have shown that experimental primes of self-affirmation reduce political 
bias towards opposing candidates (Binning et al 2010), political issues (Cohen et al 
2007), and outgroup derogation (McGregor, Haji, & Kang 2008). Self-affirmed 
participants are more equipped to handle identity-threatening information because their 
sense of self feels more secure (Klein et al 2011) and they can evaluate evidence more 
objectively (Correll et al 2004). Finally, self-uncertainty and self-affirmation appear to 
operate on the same compensatory mechanism. Several studies have found self-
uncertainty and self-affirmation primes will cancel each other out (McGregor 2006). 
Thus, self-integrity appears to play a substantial role on political behavior and subsequent 
political polarization.  
Despite the robust findings about the effects of self-integrity on attitudes 
(McQueen and Klein 2006), such findings are largely unintegrated under a common 
theoretical framework. Sherman and Cohen (2014) have pushed for their self-affirmation 
theory based on Steele’s (1988) earlier work that individuals have a motivation to 
maintain their self-integrity. However, other researchers have argued the mechanism 
driving these effects is due to a wide range of phenomena including: self-clarity, morality 
salience, meaning, or self-transcendence (Boucher, Bloch, and Pelletier 2016; Heine, 
Proulx and Vohs, 2006; Fritsche et al., 2008; Crocker, Niiya, and Mischkowski 2009). 
McGregor (2006) argues that this multitude of findings using self-uncertainty and self-
affirmation primes could benefit from a “common currency.”  
19 
Sherman and colleagues (2009) argue that self-integrity accounts for individuals 
changing their behavior after they are self-affirmed. Sherman and colleagues (2009) 
created a self-integrity scale to support their claims. They found a medium effect size (d 
= .495) for self-affirmation on their self-integrity scale compared to a control. However, 
there is a dearth of research that tests how self-uncertainty primes affect scores on the 
self-integrity scale. There are many kinds of manipulation checks that capture self-
affirmation and other variables of interest depending on the focus of the study (McQueen 
& Klein 2006; Napper, Harris, & Epton 2009). Instead of trying to capture nebulous 
concepts involved with the self that can apply to some primes and not others, it is more 
parsimonious to focus the well-studied three dimensions of meaning (evaluation, potency, 
and activity) that also can connect to the self (as I describe in detail below).  
I argue that ACT’s framework could provide that “common currency” for self-
integrity primes as well as their intersection with political bias. Additionally, ACT’s 
simple and straightforward self-sentiment scales (Mackinnon 2015) could reduce the 
likelihood of adding unwanted bias because manipulation checks that try to measure self-
integrity primes could accidentality create unwanted priming effects (McQueen & Klein 
2006; Schwinghammer, Stapel, & Blanton 2006). Thus, the ACT framework potentially 
allows for a variety of priming effects to be detected on the same self-sentiment 
measurement scales. While I am applying this mechanism for self-sentiments and 
political identities, I also argue that it can be a useful framework for other identities and 
events related to the self. 
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Connecting ACT and Self-Integrity Theories 
Affect Control Theory of Self (ACT-Self) explains how different identities and 
self-evaluations impact behavior. Just like individuals have fundamental sentiments about 
their social environments, they have fundamental sentiments about themselves. The 
fundamental self-sentiment deals with a static, overall view of one’s self. The transient 
self-sentiment is the particular state that individuals currently find themselves in. If an 
individual behaves in a way that is personally inappropriate (creating a mismatch 
between fundamental and transient sentiments), that personal affective inconsistency is 
termed inauthenticity (Heise and MacKinnon 2010). These fundamental self-sentiments 
are also measured on the dimensions of evaluation, potency, and activity. Evaluation 
measures if individuals consider their self as worthy or unworthy, potency deals with 
one’s self-competence, and activity deals with feelings of liveliness regarding one’s self 
(these correspond to self-esteem, self-efficacy, and self-activation respectively).  ACT-
Self argues that people are motivated to maintain their fundamental levels of self-esteem, 
self-efficacy, and self-activation (Heise and MacKinnon 2010). The motivational 
mechanism of ACT-Self is the desire to maintain affective consistency (MacKinnon 
2015) between the fundamental and situation self-sentiments. Maintaining these levels 
predicts how well individuals confirm their personal identities through their behaviors.  
ACT-self posits that people enact identities that are similar to their fundamental 
self-sentiments in order to avoid inauthenticity (MacKinnon 2015). Thus, individuals are 
motivated to seek out identities and subsequent behaviors that confirm their sentiments 
about themselves. If individuals think of themselves as “good” people and they do a 
“bad” behavior, then this creates inauthenticity and they are motivated to correct it. 
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When mismatches between the fundamental self and the situational self occurs, an 
individual locates a proximate behavior in EPA space and enacts it to reduce their 
inauthenticity. They can do this by behaving in a way that would mathematically cancel 
out the previous behavior. For example, if someone rates themselves positively on 
evaluation, but performs a behavior that is culturally considered to be bad, then they will 
be motivated to do something good to return their self-sentiments to their more positive 
baseline. It does not matter if someone has high or low EPA, ACT-Self predicts they will 
tend to behave in a way that supports their sentiments wherever they are in EPA space. 
For example, Robinson and Smith-Lovin (1992) found that participants with low self-
esteem thought negative feedback was more accurate and preferred to spend time with 
those who gave them negative feedback. Additionally, those who view themselves 
negatively prefer negative feedback, even though it made them feel unhappy (Swann et al 
1992). 
  More experimental evidence of the inauthenticity process is supported by a 
classic study by Wiggins and Heise (1987). Wiggins and Heise (1987) tested if 
mismatches between one’s global and situational self-sentiments could affect consequent 
behavior. They first had student participants rate themselves on self-evaluation and found 
that the mean response was positive. They then experimentally induced one group of 
participants to feel embarrassed due to the negative actions of a secretary who was a 
confederate in the study. The group of participants who felt embarrassed had the 
opportunity to engage in a nice behavior towards another student and they did so 
(resolving the inauthenticity they previously experienced with the secretary by doing a 
positive action). However, a separate group of students who felt embarrassed had the 
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opportunity to engage in a nice behavior to a person who appeared to be a delinquent and 
did not do so (because doing a nice thing to a “bad” person does not result in an overall 
positive action). A more recent study by Boyle (2017) found that fundamental self-
sentiments measured by EPA predict how participants rate themselves on a variety of 
traits including identities and emotions. 
Similar to the ACT findings, self-affirmation primes could cause inauthenticity in 
an individual because they are viewing themselves as more positive or as more potent 
than they typically do. This deflects the individual upwards in their transient self-
sentiments. Objectively assessing personally threatening information (such as 
information that challenges an important political identity) should deflect them 
downwards by confirming a “skeptical” identity, reduce inauthenticity, and return the 
individual to their self-sentiment baseline. Instead of relying on the concept of self-
integrity that is not connected to other types of self-primes, ACT-Self offers a clear 
metric for measuring changes in positive or negative self-sentiments. This leads to my 
first theoretical proposition:  
P1) Priming self-affirmation leads to inflated self-sentiments. 
P1a) Inflated self-sentiments increase feelings of inauthenticity. 
P1b) Inauthenticity provokes identity confirming actions. 
Furthermore, self-uncertainty could cause inauthenticity in an individual by 
having them think of themselves more negatively and less potently than they typically do. 
This inauthenticity caused by deflated self-sentiments would create motivation to engage 
in a behavior that would elevate one’s self-sentiments (such as confirming a political 
identity). ACT-self provides a common theoretical currency for both self-affirmation and 
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self-uncertainty processes (see Figure 2.3). This leads to my second theoretical 
proposition: 
P2) Priming self-uncertainty leads to deflated self-sentiments. 
P2a) Deflated self-sentiments increase feelings of inauthenticity. 
P2b) Inauthenticity provokes identity confirming actions. 
 
Figure 2.3. Conceptual Model Combining Self-Affirmation and Self-Uncertainty Into 
ACT-Self.  
 
The further away one’s self-sentiments are from the impact of the prime, the 
greater motivation an individual will have to engage in a behavior to self-correct. This is 
consistent with research that found those with high self-esteem are impacted more by 
self-uncertainty primes (Boucher, Bloch, and Pelletier 2016) and those with low self-
esteem are impacted more by self-affirmation primes (Düring and Jessop 2015). Low 
self-esteem could approximate those with lower fundamental self-evaluations and there 
would be greater distance for lower self-esteem individuals and a self-affirmation prime 
that creates a highly positive situational self-sentiment; thereby making them more likely 
to accept identity threatening information.  
ACT allows for self-affirmation, self-uncertainty, and self-esteem2 to be measured 
on the same dimensions (evaluation, potency, and activity) while also assessing the 
 
2 In ACT-Self, self-esteem can be measured by one’s fundamental self-sentiments. 
MacKinnon (2015) argues that measuring self-esteem on these three dimensions through 
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conflict they create in the self (through inauthenticity). Previous research does not 
categorically state whether self-uncertainty and self-affirmation influence psychological 
states equally, but in opposite directions. However, ACT-Self keeps it simple by 
measuring both priming effects on an individual’s self-EPA to account for differences 
between one’s fundamental self and their situational self. As mentioned above, the 
enacting of identities can resolve inauthenticity regardless if the deflection was positive 
or negative. If one is deflected downward (i.e. self-uncertainty), confirming a positively 
rated identity reduces inauthenticity. If one is deflected upward (i.e. self-affirmation), 
confirming a negatively rated identity reduces inauthenticity.  
I contend that self-affirmation and self-uncertainty create a discrepancy between 
fundamental self-sentiments and situational (transient) self-sentiments (experienced as 
inauthenticity). I summarized this mechanism with my propositions 1 and 2. This process 
causes individuals to enact identities that in a way that helps reaffirm their fundamental 
self-sentiments and reduce the feelings of inauthenticity. Figure 2.3 shows the conceptual 
map that illustrates the link between transient changes in self-sentiments and the 
motivation to return to fundamental self-sentiments by identity confirming actions. 
Importantly, I do not think this mechanism is unique to politics, as it should occur with 
any identities and events related to the self. My dissertation approaches the identity 
processes on political bias as well as social network effects. In the next section, I will 
describe the theoretical background and arguments for how social networks impacts 
political bias.  
 
semantic differential scales reduces ambiguity and conceptual confusion found in more 
traditional self-esteem scales.   
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Theoretical Background of Social Networks on Political Bias 
Studying social network structure can help explain the causes of political 
polarization. Individuals can obtain novel information from those in their network who 
disagree with them (e.g., Aral & Van Alstyne 2011; Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973). Some 
research suggests exposure to different ideas can lead to weaker adherence to existing 
attitudes (Bienenstock, Bonacich, and Oliver 1990; Druckman and Nelson 2003), but 
others do not (Kahan 2012; Taber and Lodge 2006).  I argue that the specifics of the 
relationships an individual has within their network is a crucial variable that can account 
for these inconsistencies in the literature.    
Homophily, the principle that individuals with similar characteristics associate 
with each other more frequently, is a well-studied phenomenon is sociology (McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). The characteristics subject to homophily can include 
demographics such as age, sex, race, and education, but also more abstract concepts like 
emotions (Kramer, Guillory, and Hancock 2014) and media preferences (Christakis and 
Fowler 2009). Below I briefly review some of the research showing how the composition 
of our social networks can also influence the nature of our ideological beliefs as well. 
How Social Network Homogeneity Increases Polarized Beliefs 
Effects of network homogeneity appear in studies looking at both religious and 
political ideologies, suggesting that any strongly held belief system can be influenced by 
those with whom we interact. Religious individuals who have greater shared agreement 
in their social network are more likely to maintain their beliefs on abortion (Petersen 
2001), premarital sex, and creationism (Hill, 2014). Bienenstock, Bonacich, and Oliver 
(1990) found that heterogeneity of religiosity, gender, education, and racial identification 
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among an individual’s close ties can reduce the likelihood of the respondent holding 
certain socially conservative beliefs. Likewise, results from national adult and student 
samples show decreased conviction in political beliefs with greater political heterogeneity 
in one’s social network (Visser and Mirabile 2004). Consistent with these findings, 
network heterogeneity is also associated with a decreased partisan identity salience 
(Lupton, Singh, and Thorton 2014). 
Research by Jost and colleagues (2018) found that both Democrats and 
Republicans have preferences to maintain politically homogeneous social networks and 
Boutyline and Willer (2015) found the preference for homogenous networks may be 
more pronounced in conservatives. Additionally, a Pew Research Poll (2014) found that 
35% Democrats and 50% of Republicans prefer to live in places with people who mostly 
share their political beliefs. Other work (Facciani and Brashears 2019; Parsons 2015) has 
shown that network homogeneity is linked to greater ideological polarization.  
Recent work by Boutyline and Willer (2017) found that the most extreme 
partisans had the most politically homogenous networks on social media. Williams and 
colleagues (2015) found that Twitter communities with mixed political attitudes were less 
likely to hold a strongly polarized view towards climate change. An experiment by 
Keating and colleagues (2016) went beyond correlational measures and found that 
political attitudes become more extreme after a group discussion with those who share 
one’s political beliefs. Additionally, respondents also tend to overestimate how much 
their network shares their political beliefs (Goel, Mason, and Watts 2010) and political 
echo-chambers tend to become more homogeneous over time (Hutchens et al 2019). 
While causality is difficult to parse out in these studies, a longitudinal study by Lazer and 
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colleagues (2010) found that individuals do shift their political views to conform with 
their associates. While these findings suggest homogeneity increases polarization, the 
studies in the following section provide conflicting results.  
Why Social Network Homogeneity Does Not Increase Polarized Beliefs  
Findings by both Bloom and Levitan (2011) and Robinson, Leeper & Druckman 
(2016) suggest that network homogeneity has little or no effect on partisan beliefs. This 
could be because individuals often find political conflict to be unpleasant and prefer to 
avoid it if they can (Mutz 2006; Rosenberg 1954; Ulbig and Funk 1999). Druckman 
(2016) also found that network homogeneity has little or no effect on partisan beliefs. 
Instead, individuals often prefer to discuss politics with like-minded others (Cowan & 
Baldassarri 2018; Gerber et al. 2012; Huckfeldt 2007).  
Complicating matters even further are the results that suggest that being 
confronted with opposing views can strengthen existing ideas (Kahan 2012; Sunstein 
2002).  Taber and Lodge (2006) describe how partisans are psychologically motivated to 
reject information that challenges their political beliefs. Even exposure to online criticism 
towards one’s political group can increase affective polarization (Suhay, Bello-Pardo, & 
Maurer 2018). If humans are psychologically motivated to reject information that 
conflicts with their ideology, how can some exposure result in polarization and others 
result in depolarization? The answer may be in the strength of the relationship from 
where the challenging information is coming.  
Bail and colleagues (2018) paid Democrat and Republican participants to follow 
Twitter accounts of their political outgroup for one month. They found that following 
these outgroups on Twitter induced greater polarization. However, social media accounts 
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from political figures hardly have a meaningful association with the participant. Results 
by Robison, Leeper, & Druckman (2016) did not provide much support for heterogeneity 
reducing strength of political attitudes. However, their study used discussion partners 
with whom the respondent talks about “government and elections.” Importantly, such 
individuals may not be especially close to the participant. The closeness of one’s 
associates in their network appears to be crucial for determining the impact of 
homogeneity on beliefs.  
The Specifics of the Relationships Matter 
If closeness of relationship could influence political beliefs, then it is necessary to 
understand how the closeness of relationships are measured. The “important matters” 
question is one of the most studied measures of obtaining close ties of a respondent (Burt 
1984). This item simply asks participants to name individuals they know with whom they 
discuss “important matters.” The names listed from this question often include 
individuals who are close enough to the respondent where they would provide social 
resources like offering a loan or meaningful social interaction (Brashears 2014). In short, 
this item captures the associations an individual has that are most meaningful in terms of 
social support.  
Importantly, the studies mentioned above that failed to find a positive association 
between homogeneity and belief strength either did not measure personal networks with a 
name generator (Bail et al, 2018; Robison, Leeper, & Druckman 2016) or did not include 
social relationships at all, simply relying on the presentation of political arguments 
(Kahan 2012; Sunstein 2002; Taber and Lodge 2006). The studies that did find a positive 
association between homogeneity and ideological belief strength used the important 
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matters question to capture close ties (Bienenstock, Bonacich, and Oliver 1990; Facciani 
and Brashears 2019; Visser & Mirabile 2004). 
  If an individual does not have a meaningful relationship with an associate with 
whom they disagree, then such interactions might have no effect on political bias or could 
only increase the awareness of their own political identity (which may even increase 
polarization as illustrated by Bail and colleagues’ (2018) Twitter study). Individuals who 
deactivated their Facebook account for four weeks had significantly decreased political 
polarization compared to a control group, suggesting that reduced exposure from political 
disagreement among superficial ties is associated with less polarization (Allcott et al 
2019). The average user on Facebook has 377 “friends” which provides plenty of 
exposure to non-intimate social connections (Brailovskaia and Margraf 2019).3 This is 
consistent with research showing how increasing awareness to and focusing on one’s 
political ingroup identity can increase belief polarization (Guilbeault and Centola 2018; 
Unsworth and Fielding 2014). This suggests that the nature of the relationship could 
influence political attitudes.  
Bienenstock, Bonacich, and Oliver (1990) found a link between network 
homogeneity among close ties (via the important matters question) and ideological 
strength, but focused on religious beliefs and did not measure one’s feelings towards an 
outgroup. Specifically, they looked at how religious intensity and strongly religious 
associates can increase likelihood of holding certain beliefs; however, their data did not 
include whether someone shares the same religious denomination with their close 
 
3 Phua & Ahn (2016) only included college students in their study and found the average 
Facebook user had 585 “friends.” 
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associates. Facciani and Brashears (2019) included shared religious and political identity 
in their homogeneity measurement to capture if respondents share the same political and 
religious identity as their close ties. They found that having just one close tie (from the 
“important matters” name generator) who did not identify as Christian increased the 
likelihood of holding positive attitudes towards abortion access and homosexuality. 
Additionally, when looking at political identities, they found that Democrats whose 
reported close ties were all Democrats had more favorable views towards government 
assistance. Furthermore, Republicans who reported close ties who were all Republicans 
had less favorable views towards government spending.  Thus, to best capture the effect 
of social networks on political polarization, researchers should include 1) a measurement 
of close ties using the “name generator” technique and 2) whether those names given 
share the same identity with the respondent.  
Theoretical Connection Between Network Composition and Political Polarization 
The importance of close ties for belief strength is consistent with early theorizing 
by Cooley (1902) who argued that social feedback from other people is more influential 
if those people are deemed relevant by the individual receiving the feedback. Berger 
(1967) argued shared ideological agreement from associates can help maintain our belief 
structure. Smith and Emerson (1998) argued that those who are especially close to us are 
most necessary to maintain these beliefs. While Smith and Emerson (1998) and Berger 
(1967) theorized about religiosity in particular, I argue the same mechanism can be 
applied to political ideology. Both political and religious ideologies provide people with 
meaning (Kay et al 2008). Thus, I contend that one’s close ties (when measured 
correctly) do impact one’s political beliefs. This leads me to my third proposition:  
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P3) Political homogeneity among one’s close ties increases polarized beliefs  
Thus far, I have focused on the link between shared political agreement in one’s 
personal network and the strength of political beliefs (Facciani and Brashears 2019; 
Visser and Mirabile 2004). However, it is important to also consider homogeneity effects 
on feelings towards the outgroup and ingroup to capture affective polarization as well. As 
mentioned above, political differences appear to be rooted in identity (Green, Palmquist, 
& Schickler 2004) and emotion toward one’s ingroup (Iyengar et al 2018). Parsons 
(2015) did find support for political homogeneity effects on affective polarization, but did 
not use the “important matters” question and only had a simple like/dislike measure of 
the outgroup in his study.  
Studying both evaluation and potency would better capture how one feels about 
their political ingroups and outgroups. Both Democrats and Republicans rate their 
ingroups higher on warmth and competence (Eriksson & Funcke 2015; Crawford et al 
2013). This suggests that partisans both like their ingroup more and believe they are more 
likely to carry out goals. Once these sentiments are altered, the likelihood of behaviors 
involving these groups would also be changed. As referenced above when discussing 
Affect Control Theory, individuals are motivated to maintain consistency between how 
positive they rate an actor and the behavior they engage in (Smith-Lovin and Heise 
1988). This leads to my 4th and 5th propositions:  
 
P4) Political homogeneity among one’s close ties produces more positive and 
empowered sentiments for the ingroup 
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P4a) The more positive sentiments one has for their ingroup, the more likely they 
will rate their ingroup engaging in positive behavior  
P5) Political homogeneity among one’s close ties produces less positive and 
empowered sentiments for the outgroup 
P5a) The more negative sentiments one has for their outgroup, the more likely 
they will rate their outgroup engaging in negative behavior  
Beyond rating outgroups and social events, research on network homogeneity 
could benefit from including how political groups evaluate information that conflicts with 
their ideology. Self-affirmation primes have been well established to make individuals 
more open to identity threatening evidence (Cohen and Sherman 2006), but would 
individuals be more open to identity threatening evidence if they had heterogenous 
personal networks? Heterogeneity in one’s personal network should decrease affective 
polarization and negative evaluations of the outgroup. Importantly, reduced negative 
feelings towards the outgroup is an important mediator between intergroup contact and a 
reduction of prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008). If an individual has more positive 
feelings towards their outgroup, then they view that group as less threatening (Smith and 
Mackie 2015). Less negative feelings towards a political outgroup is associated with less 
extreme political beliefs (Lelkes 2018; Webster and Abramowitz 2015). Thus, positive 
and meaningful interactions with a political outgroup could reduce negative affect and 
increase agreement with goals of the political outgroup.  
I have described above the conflicting results on how personal networks impact 
political beliefs. Some research suggests additional exposure to conflicting worldviews 
can lead to weaker adherence to existing attitudes (Bienenstock, Bonacich, and Oliver 
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1990; Druckman and Nelson 2003), but others do not (Kahan 2012; Taber and Lodge 
2006).  This can sometimes result in the perception that exposure to opposing views does 
not reduce polarization, but I argue the specifics of ties matter when determining how our 
associates influence our feelings towards political groups. I argue that including the 
variable with whom the participant discusses “important matters” is crucial for 
accounting for these inconsistencies. I will include this measure of “important matters” in 
my second study to capture a specific account of one’s homogeneity in their political 
network.  
Overview of Studies  
My dissertation aims to study micro- and meso-level processes that influence 
political polarization. In this literature review, I described how political polarization is a 
growing problem in the United States. Such political polarization can be thought of in 
terms of identity and applying the exogenous variables of self-integrity primes provide a 
meaningful intersection with this process. I also argue that applying Affect Control 
Theory allows for the combination in a rigorous and parsimonious manner.  
In my first study, I evaluated whether a self-uncertainty prime would increase 
political polarization and if self-affirmation could decrease political polarization within 
Democrat and Republican participants. To measure political polarization, I had my 
participants rate their political ingroup and outgroup on evaluation, potency, and activity. 
I also had them rate the likelihood of social events involving their political ingroups and 
outgroups. This measurement allows for social scientists to apply ACT when studying 
polarization. The framework of Affect Control Theory (evaluation, potency, and activity, 
as well as deflection) allows researchers to more rigorously, and parsimoniously capture 
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the phenomena that influence affective polarization. ACT also offers an explicit 
framework which can test the subjective likelihood of intergroup behavior, provides a 
standardized metric for comparing American political subcultures to other subcultures, 
and offers a theoretical bridge to connect the two types of social psychologies. 
In my second study, I moved to the meso level and evaluated how homogeneity in 
one’s personal networks would impact political bias. I collected ego network data from 
Republican and Democrat participants using the “important matters” measure. 
Participants also indicated if the individuals listed shared their political identity or not, 
which allowed me to calculate the degree of political homogeneity in my participant’s 
personal networks. I predicted that greater political homogeneity would be associated 
with increased political bias regarding the feelings of ingroups and outgroups, as well as 
the subjective likelihood of social events involving those groups. Both Study 1 and Study 
2 apply ACT’s framework in their outcome variables capturing political polarization. 
Thus, I isolate how different social factors (self-integrity manipulation or personal 
network homogeneity) influence my measures of political polarization.
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 1 
Methods 
Project and Measures Description 
Study 1 aimed to evaluate how self-integrity primes influence self-sentiments and 
if this change in self-sentiments will impact political bias. The self-integrity primes are 
self-uncertainty, self-affirmation, and neutral primes (for the control group). The self-
uncertainty prime was adopted from McGregor and colleagues (2001) self-uncertainty 
prime asked participants to write a time when they felt uncertain about themselves and 
their future. The self-affirmation prime was adopted from Sherman and colleagues’ 
(2009) study where they asked participants to pick a value that was important to them and 
then write about a time when they enacted this value. The control condition (McQueen & 
Klein 2006) had participants write about a value that was important to someone else and 
write about how someone may find it important to them when enacted (see Appendix A). 
Finally, at the end of the study, I had measures of demographics (age, race, sex, 
education) and how important one’s political identity was to them (Appendix C).  
My first measure of political bias had participants rate political ingroups and 
outgroups on evaluation, potency, and activity using the ACT framework. Additionally, 
participants rated how likely events were to happen that involved the political groups 
doing good and bad behaviors. Because I had participants record EPA ratings of the 
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groups and behaviors, I can calculate deflection scores and determine if they 
correlate with subjective likelihood ratings.  
Finally, because I kept the entire study on the metrics of the ACT framework, I 
had participants evaluate their fundamental and transient self-sentiments. Thus, I had 
participants record their EPA for “myself as I really am” at the start of the experiment. 
Then I had participants record “myself as I currently feel” after they completed their 
prime. In order to be able to connect self-integrity primes to the ACT framework, I 
should detect a change in self-sentiments depending on the condition the participant is in. 
To detect if this change in self-sentiments occurred, I conducted a pre-test only 
evaluating self-uncertainty and self-affirmation effects on transient self-sentiments.  
Pre-test for Study 1 
I conducted a pre-test evaluating whether the self-affirmation and self-uncertainty 
primes significantly impacted any self-sentiments before collecting data for Study 1. 
Participants were recruited from Mechanical Turk’s online population. Mechanical Turk 
has provided a reputable outlet for researchers to post studies for participants to sign up 
for and receive payment (Mason and Suri 2012). Previous work on self-integrity primes 
(McQueen and Klein 2006) suggests that at least 30 subjects per condition are necessary 
to achieve a power of .90 at the .05 alpha level. Participants were paid $0.50 each to 
complete this quick experiment (estimated 5-minute completion time or less). 
After 30 participants were randomly assigned into a self-affirmation or self-
uncertainty condition, they read a consent form in order to participate. Participants then 
rated themselves on evaluation, potency, and activity for “myself as I currently feel” as 
well as “myself as I really am.” After that, participants completed either the self-
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affirmation or self-uncertainty prime (see Appendix A). Then, participants completed a 
brief filler task (see Appendix B) to reduce demand characteristics. This filler task was 
the self-integrity scale by Sherman and colleagues (2009) and has traditionally been used 
as a manipulation check for the self-affirmation prime. Finally, participants were asked to 
again rate themselves on EPA for “myself as I currently feel” and complete a few 
demographic questions before they were debriefed (see Appendix C). To test my first 
hypothesis, I completed a series of t-tests on the self-sentiment ratings after the prime 
between the two conditions for EPA. If there was a significant difference on these self-
sentiment ratings between conditions, then this suggested the priming effects could be 
measured using ACT methodology. While I predicted that each sentiment could be 
impacted by the primes, the evaluation sentiment seems to have the most overlap with 
self-affirmation and self-uncertainty.  
Self-affirmation Higher EPA Hypothesis: Self-affirmation prime will yield higher self-
sentiments on EPA compared to self-uncertainty prime 
 
Study 1 Hypotheses 
Study 1 evaluated whether self-affirmation and self-uncertainty primes influenced 
political polarization. As a baseline, I predict both Democrats and Republicans will rate 
their ingroup much more positively than the outgroup on the evaluation and potency 
dimensions (EP). Previous work (Eriksson and Funcke 2015; Crawford et al. 2013) has 
shown both Democrats and Republicans rate their ingroups higher than outgroups on 
warmth and competence, suggesting that they both like them more and believe they are 
more likely to carry out goals. As mentioned in my theory section, the activity dimension 
does not have as much theoretical support to make predictions about intergroup attitudes.  
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H1: Ingroup EP Bias Hypothesis: Individuals who self-identify with a political 
subgroup (p) will rate outgroup political identities significantly lower on EP than ingroup 
political identities  
 
Beyond the evaluation and potency ratings, I predict Democrats and Republicans 
should have a partisan bias consistent with their ingroup favoritism/outgroup dislike as 
well. Ingroup members should rate the likelihood of their group engaging in a good 
behavior as more likely than the outgroup doing the same behavior. Additionally, ingroup 
members should rate the likelihood of their outgroup engaging in bad behavior as more 
likely compared to their ingroup.  
H2a: Ingroup helping likelihood bias hypothesis: Individuals who self-identify with a 
political subgroup (p) will rate their ingroup engaging in a good behavior as more likely 
than the outgroup 
 
H2b: Outgroup bullying likelihood bias hypothesis: Individuals who self-identify with a 
political subgroup (p) will rate their outgroup engaging in a bad behavior as more likely 
than the ingroup 
 
While political ingroups and outgroups should differ in their EP ratings, I predict 
using self-integrity primes can impact this difference. I predict that participants who are 
self-affirmed will rate the outgroup with less negativity and with higher competence, 
because higher competence relates to how threatening a group is (and self-affirmation has 
been shown to buffer against threat). However, I also predict that self-uncertainty will 
increase their ingroup’s EP ratings while decreasing their outgroup’s EP ratings because 
the defensive feeling from the prime will motivate individuals to cling to the safety of 
their political group’s goodness and effectiveness. Because my theoretical argument is 
based in ACT-Self, I argue that self-uncertainty and self-affirmation primes create a 
discrepancy from fundamental self-sentiments (experienced as inauthenticity). This then 
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causes individuals to form impressions of all types of events (including those that involve 
political actors) which reaffirm their self-sentiments and reduce their feelings of 
inauthenticity.  
H3a: Self-uncertainty increase ingroup EP hypothesis: Deflated self-sentiments via 
self-uncertainty will cause individuals who self-identify with a political subgroup (p) to 
increase the EP of their political ingroup  
H3b: Self-uncertainty decrease outgroup EP hypothesis: Deflated self-sentiments via 
self-uncertainty will cause individuals who self-identify with a political subgroup (p) to 
decrease the EP of their political outgroup 
H4a: Self-affirmation decrease ingroup EP hypothesis: Inflated self-sentiments via self-
affirmation will cause individuals who self-identify with a political subgroup (p) to 
decrease the EP of their political ingroup  
H4b: Self-affirmation increase outgroup EP hypothesis: Inflated self-sentiments via 
self-affirmation will cause individuals who self-identify with a political subgroup (p) to 
increase the EP of their political outgroup 
In addition to the self-integrity primes impacting the evaluation ratings of 
ingroups and outgroups, I predict they will influence how individuals respond to the 
likelihood of claims that reflect opportunities for both ingroup favoritism and outgroup 
animus. The control group should show an increased likelihood of expecting the ingroup 
to engage in good vs. bad behavior and the outgroup to engage in bad vs. good behavior. 
Ingroup favoritism will be demonstrated by a reduction in subjective likelihood of bad 
behavior by the ingroup and an increased likelihood of good behavior. Outgroup hostility 
will be demonstrated by an increase in subjective likelihood of bad behavior and a 
decreased likelihood of good behavior from the outgroup.  
Self-affirmation will cause positive deflection in an individual such that 
objectively assessing threatening information could return them to their self-baseline. 
Furthermore, self-uncertainty will cause negative deflection in an individual and 
demonstrating greater ingroup commitment will direct a return to baseline. Thus, self-
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affirmation will reduce ingroup bias while evaluating the behavior of their ingroup and 
outgroup. Self-uncertainty will create more ingroup bias when evaluating intergroup 
behavior. This prediction is aligned with the “consistency effect” (Smith-Lovin and Heise 
1988) that suggests lower deflection occurs when the evaluation of the actor and the 
behavior are close to each other mathematically.  
H5a: Self-uncertainty increase ingroup helping likelihood hypothesis: Self-uncertainty 
will increase likelihood ratings of ingroup doing good behavior 
H5b: Self-uncertainty increase outgroup bullying likelihood hypothesis: Self-
uncertainty will increase likelihood ratings of outgroup doing bad behavior 
H6a: Self-affirmation decrease ingroup helping likelihood hypothesis: Self-affirmation 
will decrease likelihood ratings of ingroup doing good behavior 
H6b: Self-affirmation decrease outgroup bullying likelihood hypothesis: Self-
affirmation will decrease likelihood ratings of outgroup doing bad behavior 
Subjects 
Participants were recruited from Prolific’s online population and political 
database. Prolific is very similar to Mechnical Turk as it provides a reputable outlet for 
researchers to recruit participants for online studies (Palan and Schitter 2018). However, 
perhaps due to its size, Mechanical Turk has been a hotbed for computer scripts 
pretending to be human participants (Kennedy et al 2018).  Additionally, there are 
concerns with overall “carelessness” found in data (Aruguete et al 2019), perhaps due to 
low pay structure. Prolific is a newer platform that stresses higher minimum payments 
which may produce higher quality data, but researchers are still determining which 
platform is better. In the first study, there were three conditions, and each condition had 
50 Democrats and 50 Republicans. My power analysis suggests that I needed at least 30 
subjects per condition to achieve a power of .90 at the .05 alpha level. Because this 
experiment is online, I add 20 participants per group to account for potential data loss and 
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additional random error such as participants incorrectly listing their political affiliation. 
Thus, I recruited 300 total participants for the main experiment of this study (50 
Democrats + 50 Republicans * 3 conditions = 300). Participants were paid $1.40 to 
complete this experiment, which is $8.40 an hour, since Study 1 should take 10 minutes 
to complete. 
Procedure  
Study 1 begins by asking for consent to participate. Participants then rated 
themselves on evaluation, potency, and activity as they did in the pre-test. After the self-
evaluation measures, participants completed the priming part of the experiment and they 
were told they had to answer questions about their past experiences as well as social 
situations. Participants were then randomly assigned into a self-affirmation, self-
uncertainty, or control condition (see Appendix A).  
After completing the prime, participants rated the evaluation, potency, and 
activity of two political identities and one neutral identity. The political identities were 
Democrat and Republican. The neutral identity was “person” because they are positive 
and powerless identities that should cause high deflection if a bad behavior is done to 
them. Participants also rated the behaviors “bully” and “help,” so deflection of each 
social event could be calculated for each group. After rating the identities, participants 
read eight short stories about a social event involving different political and neutral 
identities. They then rated the likelihood of this event as described using a 7-point Likert 
scale from “not at all likely” to “extremely likely.” For example, participants read the 
following text: “You overhear someone saying that someone they call a “Democrat” has 
“bullied” someone they call a “Republican.” Then they answered: “how likely do you 
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think this event occurred as it was described above?” (see Appendix D). After collecting 
this data, participants rated themselves on EPA and answered demographic questions 
regarding their religiosity, political ideology (liberalism to conservatism scale), gender, 
age, and education (see Appendix C). The participant was then debriefed at the end of the 
study. 
Political ingroup members should rate their political outgroup significantly lower 
on evaluation and potency compared to their ingroup. Identities rated negatively (the 
outgroup identities) should be rated more likely to do bad behavior and less likely to do 
good behavior. Conversely, identities rated positively (the ingroup identities) should be 
rated less likely to do bad behavior and more likely to do good behavior. Consistent with 
ACT, deflection levels should positively correlate with likelihood ratings.  
Planned Analyses to Test Hypotheses 
For my pre-test, I conducted t-tests on evaluation and potency to determine if 
there was a significant difference between the self-uncertainty and self-affirmation 
conditions (Self-affirmation higher EPA hypothesis). In Study 1, I used a series of t-tests 
to determine if participants significantly rated their own political group (combining 
Democrats and Republicans) higher on evaluation and potency than their outgroup (H1: 
Ingroup EP bias hypothesis). I also used t-tests to determine if participants rated the 
likelihood of their ingroup doing a good behavior (H2a: Ingroup helping likelihood bias 
hypothesis) and their outgroup doing a bad behavior (H2b: Outgroup bullying likelihood 
bias hypothesis).  
Ordinary least squares regression models evaluated whether the priming 
influenced political bias. Self-uncertainty was contrasted against the control group as the 
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independent variable, and ingroup and outgroup sentiment ratings were the outcome 
variables to test H3a: Self-uncertainty increase ingroup EP and H3b: Self-uncertainty 
decrease outgroup EP. To test H4a: Self-affirmation decrease ingroup EP hypothesis and 
H4b: Self-affirmation increase outgroup EP, self-uncertainty was contrasted against the 
control group again, and the ratings of the social events of the different groups were the 
outcome variables.  
In a similar process, I contrasted self-affirmation against the control group as the 
independent variable in my regression modeling, and the ingroup and outgroup ratings 
were the outcome variables to test H5a: Self-uncertainty increase ingroup helping 
likelihood and H5b: Self-uncertainty increase outgroup bullying likelihood. To test H6a: 
Self-affirmation decrease ingroup helping likelihood hypothesis and H6b: Self-
affirmation decrease outgroup bullying likelihood, self-affirmation was contrasted 
against the control group again and the ratings of the social events of the different groups 
were the outcome variables. In these regression models, I also included party 
identification to test for any significant differences between Democrats and Republicans. 
Table 3.1 summarizes all the hypotheses for Study 1.  
Table 3.1. Summary List of Study 1 Hypotheses 
Study 1 Hypotheses List 
Self-affirmation Higher EPA (pre-test) 
H1: Ingroup EP Bias  
H2a: Ingroup helping likelihood bias 
H2b: Outgroup bullying likelihood bias 
H3a: Self-uncertainty increase ingroup EP  
H3b: Self-uncertainty decrease outgroup EP 
H4a: Self-affirmation decrease ingroup EP 
H4b: Self-affirmation increase outgroup EP 
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H5a: Self-uncertainty increase ingroup 
helping likelihood 
H5b: Self-uncertainty increase outgroup 
bullying likelihood 
H6a: Self-affirmation decrease ingroup 
helping likelihood 
H6b: Self-affirmation decrease outgroup 
bullying likelihood 
 
In addition to the contrasts of the two priming conditions against the control 
condition, I will also contrast the self-affirmation prime against the self-uncertainty 
prime. Because I hypothesize that self-affirmation inflates self-sentiments and self-
uncertainty deflates self-sentiments, contrasting the two conditions should provide the 
most power for detecting an effect if one exists.  
Study 1 Results  
The Impact of Self-Uncertainty and Self-Affirmation on Transient Self-Sentiments 
I collected data until there were 30 participants in each the self-affirmation and 
self-uncertainty conditions who completed the task entirely.4 The goal of the pre-test was 
to determine if the “myself as I currently feel” question could capture transient self-
sentiment rating differences between the self-affirmation and self-uncertainty prime. 
Means of self-evaluation, self-potency, and self-activity were recorded for both 
conditions (see Table 3.2). The evaluation of the self-affirmation group rating was higher 
 
4 I did not include data from participants who completed the writing task in under 60 
seconds and/or did not write an essay related to their prompt. To increase the likelihood 
of longer essays for study 1, I used the wording from Sherman and colleagues (2009) 
where they ask participants in the self-affirmation condition to write three reasons why 
their most important value was important to them and then provided an example 
demonstrating its importance. This should also increase power of the priming effect, 
although the “dosage” of how much writing is necessary for self-affirmation to work is 
still understudied.  
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than the self-uncertainty group; however, it only approached significance (t = 1.20; p = 
.11) according to t-tests. The effect size for self-evaluation differences was in the small-
medium range (d = .309).  
Table 3.2. Pre-test means and standard deviations of “myself as I currently feel” ratings 
for each self-sentiment between conditions.  
Self-Sentiment 
Dimension 
Self-affirmation 
mean and SD 
Self-uncertainty 
mean and SD 
Evaluation 2.33 (1.50) 1.89 (1.27) 
Potency 0.802 (1.61) 0.611 (1.58) 
Activity 0.312 (1.83) 0.191 (1.58) 
Note: Possible ratings are from -4 to 4.  
Effect sizes in this range are not uncommon for self-affirmation studies (see 
McQueen & Klein 2006) and that includes many studies completed in the laboratory 
whereas mine was completed online (which potentially increases error). Due to the small 
sample size in the pre-test (30 subjects per condition) as well as the limited effect size, 
there is a lack of statistical power which may explain the lack of significance. Thus, it 
seems plausible that these primes are creating a disruption in one’s transient self-
evaluation (causing some detectable inauthenticity as predicted). However, the activity 
and potency dimensions were not discernibly higher and were not close to significance. 
These results provide partial support for the Self-affirmation Higher EPA hypothesis as 
only self-evaluation seems most likely to capture the effect. Study 1 investigated the 
impact of self-uncertainty and self-affirmation on political beliefs. 
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Study 1: Evaluation, Potency, and Activity Ratings of Political Ingroups vs Outgroups 
 
Table 3.3. Comparison of ingroup and outgroup sentiment ratings in control condition via 
t-tests.  
Sentiment Ingroup  Outgroup 
Evaluation  1.58 (1.32) ** -1.05 (1.74) 
Potency 1.14 (1.511) ~ 0.79 (1.77) 
Activity 0.668 (1.61) ** - 0.567 (2.15) 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
First, a series of t-tests were used to determine if there was a baseline difference 
between political ingroup and outgroup evaluation and potency in the control condition 
(see Table 3.3). Individuals in the control group rated the ingroup higher on evaluation (t 
(186) = 11.67; p <.001; d = 1.70), potency (t (186) = 1.45; p = .035, one tailed; d = 
0.212), and activity (t (186) = 4.45; p <.001; d = 0.650) compared to the outgroup (see 
Table 3.3). This supports H1: Ingroup EP bias. However, only the differences on 
evaluation had a high magnitude of effect. Potency had a small effect and activity had a 
medium effect according to effect size measures (Cohen 1992). The weaker effect for 
potency is not surprising, as an individual can dislike a group and still consider them 
moderately competent. These sentiment ratings can be used to detect a baseline affective 
polarization for Democrat and Republican participants. Now that this baseline difference 
has been established, I can evaluate if my priming conditions influenced these effects. 
Likelihood Ratings of Political Group Behavior in Social Events 
Table 3.4. Comparison of ingroup and outgroup likelihood ratings in control condition 
via t-tests.  
Social Event Ingroup Likelihood 
Rating 
Outgroup 
Likelihood Rating 
Helping a Person 6.10 (0.921) ** 4.85 (1.67) 
Helping an outgroup (ingroup) 
member 
5.39 (1.11) ** 4.10 (1.92) 
Bullying a Person 4.31 (1.71) ** 5.75 (1.34) 
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Bullying an outgroup (ingroup) 
member 
4.50 (1.63) ** 5.78 (1.42) 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
Beyond rating ingroup and outgroup members differently, my study also tested if 
participants would rate the likelihood of social events differently depending on the 
behavior done by the ingroup or outgroup (see Table 3.4). Ingroup members rated the 
likelihood of their group helping a person as significantly more likely than outgroup 
members helping a person (t (186) = 6.35; p <.001; d = 0.927)). Ingroup members also 
rated the likelihood of their group helping an outgroup member as significantly more 
likely than outgroup members helping an ingroup member (t (186) = 5.61; p <.001; d = 
0.819)) Additionally, both have large magnitudes of effects. This provides support for 
H2a: Ingroup helping likelihood bias. 
Additionally, ingroup members rated the likelihood of their outgroup bullying a 
person as significantly more likely than ingroup members bullying a person (t (186) = 
6.38; p <.001; d = 0.931). Ingroup members also rated the likelihood of their outgroup 
bullying an ingroup member as significantly more likely than ingroup members bullying 
an outgroup member ((t (186) = 5.74; p <.001; d = 0.837)). As with the helping bias, 
these bullying bias assessments have large magnitudes of effects. Thus, H2b: Outgroup 
bullying likelihood bias was also supported. These results show that likelihood ratings do 
capture significant political bias for participants who belong to political groups.  
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Manipulation Check of Self-Uncertainty and Self-Affirmation Primes 
 
Table 3.5. Comparison of self-sentiments (and self-integrity scale) after self-uncertainty, 
self-affirmation, and control primes.  
 
Self-sentiment Self-uncertainty 
condition 
Control Self-
affirmation 
condition 
Self-evaluation 1.27(1.68) 1.36 (1.73) * 1.78 (1.60) 
Self-potency 0.46 (1.71) 0.42 (1.81) 0.41 (1.77) 
Self-activity -0.08(1.66) 0.24 (1.70) 0.31 (1.59) 
Self-integrity scale mean 5.54 (0.956) 5.57 (.982) 5.64 
(0.886) 
Note: T-tests revealed that only self-evaluation was significantly different (* = p <.05) 
when contrasted against self-uncertainty and the self-affirmation condition.   
 
I began by running several ANOVAs to evaluate whether there were significant 
differences on self-rating measures as a manipulation check (Table 3.5). I predicted that 
these conventional self-uncertainty and self-affirmation primes could be measured by my 
new transient self-sentiment scale. My pre-test results suggested that I should see a 
significant difference on self-evaluation, but I am interested if a larger sample size could 
reveal differences between potency and activity as well.  
An ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the three conditions on 
self-evaluation (F= 2,279) 2.49; p = .0425; one tailed). However, the Bonferroni post-hoc 
test only approached one-tailed significance between the self-uncertainty and self-
affirmation conditions (p = .111). The Bonferroni also showed nonsignificant differences 
between self-affirmation and control (p = .266) and self-uncertainty and control (p < 
.999). The F test is a global test and is not as conservative as the Bonferroni tests, which 
could cause this discrepancy. A protected t-test on self-evaluation between the self-
uncertainty and self-affirmation conditions was significant ((t (186) = 2.134; p = .034; d 
= 0.311)). A t-test on self-evaluation between the control and self-affirmation conditions 
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was also significant ((t (189) = 1.171; p = .044, one-tailed; d = 0.249)). Thus, the largest 
effect is between the two treatment conditions on self-evaluation ratings, but there is also 
a borderline effect for the self-affirmation group compared to the control as well.  
While self-evaluation produced some borderline significant differences, ANOVAs 
revealed that self-potency (F= 2,279) 0.02; p = .9801) and self-activity (F= 2,279) 1.45; p 
= .236) did not even approach significance between the three conditions. The self-
integrity scale was also not significant between the conditions either (F= 2,279) 0.28; p = 
.756). This suggests that the self-evaluation scale could better capture changes in 
transient self-sentiments than the self-integrity measure.   
Consistent with my pre-test findings, self-uncertainty does reduce self-evaluation 
ratings compared to the self-affirmation group, but this is a small effect. While this effect 
lacks a large magnitude, it still suggests that the contrast between the two treatment 
conditions could produce significant differences in an individual’s transient self-
evaluation. Self-affirmation appears inflate one’s self-evaluation sentiments and self-
uncertainty appears to deflate one’s self-evaluations. Next, I will determine if these small 
shifts in self-sentiments (and subsequent inauthenticity) could influence how Democrats 
and Republicans feel towards their respective political ingroup and outgroup. 
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Impact of Self-Uncertainty and Self-Affirmation on Political Group Ratings 
 
Table 3.6: Ordinary Least Squares Regression models showing the contrast of self-
uncertainty and control conditions on ingroup and outgroup ratings. 
 
 
Ingroup 
Evaluation 
Ingroup 
Potency 
Outgroup 
Evaluation 
Outgroup 
Potency 
Self-
Uncertainty  
-0.371 
(-1.29) 
0.109 
(0.35) 
-0.804* 
(-2.40) 
0.435 
(1.28) 
Democrat 
Identification 
-0.018 
(-0.06) 
-0.293 
(-0.96) 
-0.918** 
(-2.80) 
1.00** 
(3.03) 
Democrat 
Identification 
and Self-
Uncertainty 
Interaction 
0.546 
(1.37) 
-0.367 
(-0.85) 
0.596 
(1.28) 
0.056 
(0.12) 
 
Constant  
 
1.598** 
(7.94) 
 
1.291** 
(5.91) 
 
-0.581* 
(-2.48) 
 
0.275             
(1.16) 
 
N 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
I first tested if the self-uncertainty condition contrasted against the control group 
would yield any significant differences on the ratings of political group sentiments. A 
regression analysis did not reveal a significant impact on ingroup evaluation, ingroup 
potency, or outgroup potency (see Table 3.6). However, being in the self-uncertainty 
condition compared to the control condition had a significant negative effect on outgroup 
evaluation (p = .018). Despite the manipulation check not yielding significance between 
these two groups, there was still a significant impact on at least one group rating in this 
contrast.  
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I also wanted to assess any differences between Democrats and Republicans and 
found that identifying as a Republican was significantly associated with higher outgroup 
evaluation (p = .006) and identifying as a Democrat was significantly associated with 
higher outgroup potency (p = .003). These results were unexpected, but they could be 
explained by previous research that revealed differences in how Democrats are rate 
themselves slightly higher on warmth and Republicans rate themselves slightly higher on 
competence (Eriksson and Funcke 2015).  
 
Table 3.7: Ordinary Least Squares Regression models showing the contrast of self-
affirmation and control conditions on ingroup and outgroup ratings 
 
 
 
Ingroup 
Evaluation 
Ingroup 
Potency 
Outgroup 
Evaluation 
Outgroup 
Potency 
Self-
Affirmation  
0.334 
(1.29) 
0.252 
(0.86) 
-0.017 
(-0.05) 
0.141 
(0.40) 
Democrat 
Identification 
-0.018 
(-0.07) 
-0.293 
(-1.00) 
-0.918* 
(-2.43) 
1.00** 
(2.29) 
Democrat 
Identification 
and Self-
Uncertainty 
Interaction 
-0.559 
(-1.50) 
-0.614 
(-1.48) 
0.030 
(0.06) 
0.004 
(-0.01) 
 
Constant  
 
1.598** 
(8.45) 
 
1.291** 
(6.15) 
 
-0.581* 
(-2.15) 
 
0.275             
(1.11) 
 
N 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
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Next, I tested the effect self-affirmation had against the control condition. Self-
affirmation contrasted against the control condition did not have a significant effect for 
ingroup evaluation, ingroup potency, outgroup evaluation, or outgroup potency. This null 
result occurred despite there being a slight difference in the manipulation check between 
the self-affirmation and control conditions. As seen in Table 3.6, identifying as a 
Republican was significantly associated with higher outgroup evaluation (p = .016). and 
identifying as a Democrat was significantly associated with higher outgroup potency (p = 
.004). 
 
Table 3.8. Ordinary Least Squares Regression models showing the contrast of self-
uncertainty and self-affirmation conditions on ingroup and outgroup ratings 
 
 
Ingroup 
Evaluation 
Ingroup 
Potency 
Outgroup 
Evaluation 
Outgroup 
Potency 
Self-
Uncertainty vs 
Self-
affirmation 
  
-0.716* 
(-2.59) 
-0.142 
(-0.49) 
-0.786* 
(-2.15) 
0.294 
(0.88) 
Democrat 
Identification 
-0.577* 
(-2.14) 
-.9077** 
(-3.18) 
-0.887* 
(-2.49) 
1.00** 
(3.08) 
Democrat 
Identification 
and Self-
Uncertainty 
Interaction 
1.106** 
(2.88) 
0.246 
(0.61) 
0.556 
(1.11) 
0.060 
(0.13) 
 
Constant  
 
1.943** 
(10.12) 
 
1.523** 
(7.61) 
 
-0.598* 
(-2.36) 
 
0.924~             
(5.42) 
 
N 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
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Finally, I contrasted the group sentiment ratings between the self-affirmation and 
self-uncertainty conditions. This should create the largest effect if one exists, as the 
primes are both creating inauthenticity in different directions. Participants in the self-
uncertainty condition were more likely to rate the outgroup as less good compared to the 
self-affirmation condition (p = .032). This is consistent with the manipulation effect 
showing a significant contrast on self-evaluation. However, no other sentiment was 
impacted by condition, except for ingroup evaluation, which was influenced in the 
opposite direction as predicted. Thus, my results did not find support for H3a: Self-
uncertainty increase ingroup EP. However, there was partial support for H3b: Self-
uncertainty decrease outgroup EP as outgroup evaluation did decrease from self-
uncertainty. For self-affirmation, I also did not find any support for H4a: Self-affirmation 
decrease ingroup EP or H4b: Self-affirmation increase outgroup EP. 
Identifying as a Democrat was negatively associated with ingroup evaluation (p = 
.034), ingroup potency (p = .002), and outgroup evaluation. (p = .014) Identifying as a 
Democrat was also positively associated with outgroup potency (p = .002). While the 
self-uncertainty prime did not produce a significant difference compared to the control on 
the manipulation check, there was a significant difference observed in the outgroup 
evaluation ratings. Additionally, contrasting self-affirmation and self-uncertainty 
conditions also revealed differences in the outgroup evaluation rating. Despite 
participants having strongly negative evaluation ratings of their outgroup, self-uncertainty 
was shown to create even stronger negative feelings of the outgroup (but no effect was 
found on the ingroup). This suggests that participants derogated their outgroup to reduce 
inauthenticity. 
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Next, I used Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) to determine whether self-
evaluation acted as a mediator between self-uncertainty and outgroup evaluation.  
According to my theory, self-uncertainty priming should create deflated self-sentiments. 
This deflation of self-evaluation should be observed in my transient self-evaluation 
measure when contrasted against self-affirmation. Once an individual’s sentiments are 
deflated, they will be motivated to adjust them, which could be done by derogating an 
outgroup (which was found for outgroup evaluation ratings).  
SEM results (see Figure 3.1) revealed that self-evaluation acted as a mediator 
between self-uncertainty and outgroup evaluation scores because it had significant a 
direct effect (p = .032) and indirect effect (p = .027; one tailed).  Self-uncertainty did 
appear to cause inauthenticity in participants (as observed by decreased self-evaluation 
scores) and they denigrated the outgroup as an attempt to reduce such inauthenticity (as 
seen by reduced outgroup evaluation scores).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. SEM coefficients and z-scores for the relationship between the self-
uncertainty and self-affirmation contrast and outgroup evaluation scores as mediated by 
self-evaluation scores.  
 
 
Self-uncertainty > 
Self-affirmation 
Self-
Evaluation 
Outgroup 
Evaluation 
β= -0.509* 
z= -2.15 
β= 0.150~ 
z= 1.93 
β= -0.431~ 
z= -1.68 
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The Impact of Self-Uncertainty and Self-Affirmation on Likelihood Ratings of Social 
Events 
Table 3.9:  Ordinary Least Squares Regression models showing self-uncertainty’s impact 
on ingroup and outgroup behavior likelihood ratings contrasted against the control 
condition.  
 
 
Ingroup 
Help 
Person Bias 
Ingroup 
Help 
Outgroup 
Bias 
Outgroup 
Bully 
Person Bias 
Outgroup 
Bully Ingroup 
Bias 
Self-
Uncertainty  
-0.320 
(-0.96) 
-0.259 
(-0.77) 
0.165 
(0.41) 
0.596 
(1.50) 
Democrat 
Identification 
0.585~ 
(1.80) 
0.009 
(0.03) 
0.598 
(1.51) 
0.307 
(0.79) 
Democrat and 
Self-
Uncertainty 
Interaction 
0.084 
(0.18) 
-0.072 
(-0.15) 
-0.669 
(-1.19) 
-0.891 
(-1.61) 
 
Constant  
 
0.956** 
(4.12) 
 
1.282** 
(5.42) 
 
1.130** 
(3.99) 
 
1.130**             
(4.06) 
 
N 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
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Table 3.10.  Ordinary Least Squares Regression models showing self-affirmation’s 
impact on ingroup and outgroup behavior likelihood ratings contrasted against control 
condition.  
 
 
Ingroup 
Help 
Person Bias 
Ingroup 
Help 
Outgroup 
Bias 
Outgroup 
Bully 
Person Bias 
Outgroup 
Bully Ingroup 
Bias 
Self-
Uncertainty  
-0.190 
(-0.57) 
-0.367 
(-1.11) 
0.124 
(0.33) 
0.146 
(0.39) 
Democrat 
Identification 
0.585~ 
(1.74) 
0.009 
(0.03) 
0.598 
(1.58) 
0.307 
(0.82) 
Democrat and 
Self-
Uncertainty 
Interaction 
-0.517 
(-1.09) 
-0.194 
(-0.42) 
-0.583 
(-1.09) 
-0.458 
(-0.87) 
 
Constant  
 
0.956** 
(3.99) 
 
1.282** 
(5.43) 
 
1.130** 
(4.18) 
 
1.130**             
(4.23) 
 
N 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
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Table 3.11.  Ordinary Least Squares Regression models showing self-uncertainty’s 
impact on ingroup and outgroup behavior likelihood ratings contrasted against self-
affirmation.  
 
 
Ingroup 
Help 
Person Bias 
Ingroup 
Help 
Outgroup 
Bias 
Outgroup 
Bully 
Person Bias 
Outgroup 
Bully Ingroup 
Bias 
Self-
Uncertainty  
-0.129 
(-0.45) 
0.107 
(0.35) 
0.040 
(0.11) 
0.450 
(1.29) 
Democrat 
Identification 
0.067 
(0.24) 
-0.185 
(-0.61) 
0.015 
(0.04) 
-0.151 
(-0.44) 
Democrat and 
Self-
Uncertainty 
Interaction 
0.602 
(1.49) 
0.122 
(0.28) 
-0.086 
(-0.17) 
-0.432 
(-0.89) 
 
Constant  
 
0.765** 
(3.80) 
 
0.914** 
(4.21) 
 
1.255** 
(4.89) 
 
1.276**             
(5.26) 
 
N 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
I ran several regressions to evaluate whether the different primes would impact 
the likelihood ratings of group behaviors. Self-uncertainty’s effect contrasted against the 
control group did not have a significant effect on any of the social event likelihood biases 
(see Table 3.9). Self-affirmation’s effect contrasted against the control group also did not 
have any significant effects on the likelihood biases (see Table 3.10).  Contrasting self-
uncertainty against self-affirmation did not have a significant effect either (see Table 
3.11). Political party and the interaction term between political party and self-uncertainty 
were also not significant. 
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Despite the outgroup evaluation being influenced by self-uncertainty, this did not 
translate into changes from the likelihood ratings of social events. Thus, neither self-
uncertainty nor self-affirmation altered how participants viewed the likelihood of social 
events regarding their political ingroups and outgroups.  Thus, I failed to find support for 
H5a: Self-uncertainty increase ingroup helping likelihood, H5b: Self-uncertainty 
increase outgroup bullying likelihood, H6a: Self-affirmation decrease ingroup helping 
likelihood, and H6b: Self-affirmation decrease outgroup bullying likelihood. Table 3.12 
summarizes the results of the hypotheses for Study 1.  
Table 3.12. Summary of Hypotheses Outcomes for Study 1  
Study 1 Hypotheses Result 
Self-affirmation Higher EPA (pre-test) PS. Approached significance for E, 
but not on P&A 
H1: Ingroup EP Bias  ✓ 
H2a: Ingroup helping likelihood bias ✓  
H2b: Outgroup bullying likelihood bias ✓  
Self-integrity Prime EPA Manipulation Check  PS. SU decreased E compared to 
SA. SA higher on E compared to 
control.  
H3a: Self-uncertainty increase ingroup EP   
H3b: Self-uncertainty decrease outgroup EP PS. Only decreased outgroup 
evaluation  
H4a: Self-affirmation decrease ingroup EP  
H4b: Self-affirmation increase outgroup EP  
H5a: Self-uncertainty increase ingroup helping 
likelihood 
 
H5b: Self-uncertainty increase outgroup 
bullying likelihood 
 
H6a: Self-affirmation decrease ingroup helping 
likelihood 
 
H6b: Self-affirmation decrease outgroup 
bullying likelihood 
 
Note:  = not supported. ✓ = fully supported. PS = Partially supported.  
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Supplemental Analyses  
I evaluated whether my significant effects (Tables 5a and 5c) would still hold 
while controlling for political identity prominence (how important the participant’s 
political identity was to them). Overall, my participants felt like their political identity 
was fairly important to them (mean = 2.95; SD = 1.08) when using a 1 (not at all 
important) to 5 (very important) scale. When including this identity importance variable 
in my models, the self-uncertainty effects still held as significant (see Tables 3.13 and 
3.14). 
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Table 3.13: Ordinary Least Squares Regression models showing the contrast of self-
uncertainty and control conditions on outgroup evaluation while controlling for political 
identity importance. 
 
 
Outgroup 
Evaluation 
Political 
Identity 
Importance 
0.062 
(0.59) 
Self-
Uncertainty  
-0.785* 
(-2.33) 
Democrat 
Identification 
-0.906** 
(-2.75) 
Democrat 
Identification 
and Self-
Uncertainty 
Interaction 
0.574 
(1.23) 
 
Constant  
 
-0.775~ 
(-1.91) 
 
N 
 
188 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
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Table 3.14. Ordinary Least Squares Regression models showing the contrast of self-
uncertainty and self-affirmation conditions on outgroup evaluation while controlling for 
political identity importance 
 
 
Outgroup 
Evaluation 
Political 
Identity 
Importance 
0.180 
(1.56) 
Self-
Uncertainty vs 
Self-
affirmation 
  
-0.761* 
(-2.09) 
Democrat 
Identification 
-0.880* 
(-2.47) 
Democrat 
Identification 
and Self-
Uncertainty 
Interaction 
0.529 
(1.05) 
 
Constant  
 
-1.132** 
(-2.66) 
 
N 
 
188 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
Additionally, I tested if fundamental self-sentiments could act as a moderator for 
the self-uncertainty and self-affirmation effects. Regression analysis (Table 3.15) found 
that fundamental self-sentiments of evaluation (p <.001), potency (p <.001), and activity 
(p <.001) were all positively associated with transient self-sentiments after the prime. 
This suggests that participants with higher fundamental self-sentiments also had higher 
transient self-sentiments. The lack of main effect for self-uncertainty in this model is 
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because fundamental self-sentiments are heavily related to the transient self-sentiments, 
which accounts for a substantial amount of the variance.  
Table 3.15: Ordinary Least Squares Regression models showing Fundamental Self-
Sentiments as a Moderator for Self-Uncertainty Contrasted with Control Group  
 
 
Transient 
Self-
Evaluation 
Transient 
Self-
Potency 
Transient 
Self-
Activity 
Fundamental 
Self-Evaluation  
0.699** 
(7.49) 
  
Fundamental 
Self-Potency 
 0.775** 
(11.96) 
 
Fundamental 
Self-Activity 
  0.757** 
(10.66) 
Self-
Uncertainty vs 
Control  
 
0.143 
(0.42) 
0.107 
(0.63) 
-0.116 
(-0.66) 
Self-
Uncertainty vs 
Control and 
self-sentiment 
interaction 
-0.124 
(-0.86) 
-0.129 
(-1.42) 
-0.208* 
(-2.13) 
 
Constant  
 
0.044 
(0.19) 
 
0.198** 
(1.65) 
 
0.0001 
(0.001) 
 
N 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
The interaction term was not significant for self-uncertainty vs control and self-
evaluation or self-uncertainty vs control and self-potency.  However, the interaction term 
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of self-uncertainty vs self-affirmation and self-activity was significant and negative (p < 
.035). This suggests that those with higher fundamental self-activity were impacted more 
strongly by the self-uncertainty prime on their transient self-activity.5  
This is consistent with previous research that found individuals with high self-
esteem are impacted more by self-uncertainty primes (Boucher, Bloch, and Pelletier 
2016) One’s fundamental self-sentiments can serve as a proxy for traditional self-esteem 
measures (MacKinnon 2015). Thus, there could be greater distance for higher self-esteem 
(higher self-EPA) individuals when exposed to a self-uncertainty prime that creates a 
highly negative situational self-sentiment.  Activity may have a unique meaning for 
approximating self-esteem in this moderation process. Although, greater statistical power 
could yield significant findings for evaluation and potency as well. 
Table 3.16. Correlations between Likelihood Rating of Social Scenario and Deflection 
Scores in Control Group 
 
Social Scenario Involving 
Ingroups or Outgroups 
Correlation with 
Deflection and 
Likelihood  
Ingroup Help Person 0.038 
Ingroup Help Outgroup -0.053 
Ingroup Bully Person -0.418** 
Ingroup Bully Outgroup -0.359** 
Outgroup Help Person -0.494** 
 
5 When analyzing possible moderator effects for self-affirmation, I found that the self-
affirmation vs control interaction terms were not significant for any of the self-
sentiments. 
64 
Outgroup Bully Person  0.029 
Outgroup Help Ingroup -0.316** 
Outgroup Bully Ingroup 0.020 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
Finally, I also assessed if the deflection scores (calculated from the EPA ratings of 
each social event component) were significantly associated with likelihood ratings of the 
events. I found that 4/8 of the social event likelihood ratings had a significantly negative 
association with calculated deflection scores (see Table 3.16). Heise and MacKinnon 
(1987) found that the correlations decrease when there is vagueness introduced into the 
social event. Because the identities used in my scenarios are somewhat vague, it could 
explain why only half (4/8) of the social events had significant correlations.6   
Discussion: Study 1 
Participants rated their political ingroups as more positive, potent, and active than 
their political outgroups. Participants also rated the likelihood of their ingroup doing a 
helping behavior as more likely than the outgroup; as well as the likelihood of their 
outgroup doing a bullying behavior. Thus, political polarization was found as a baseline 
with both EPA and the subjective likelihood of processing events involving political 
groups.  
 
6 On an exploratory level, I was interested if party identification could influence the 
neutral words in my study (person, bully, help). I only included the control group to avoid 
priming biases. I found that identifying as a Republican was associated with rating 
“person” more positive (p = .005) and more powerful (p = .036) Additionally, identifying 
as a Democrat was associated with rating “bullying someone” as more active (p = .049). 
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The self-uncertainty prime did decrease participants’ transient self-evaluation. 
This is consistent with the pre-test and the larger sample size may have helped reach 
significance. Thus, the measure of “myself as I currently feel” does seem to capture 
inauthenticity created by the prime. Inauthenticity does seem most likely to be captured 
by the evaluation dimension, though the activity dimension was also higher in the self-
affirmation condition, but not significant.  
To reduce this inauthenticity, I predicted participants would both derogate the 
outgroup and support their group, which would be measured on the same sentiment 
scales. Self-uncertainty did reduce outgroup evaluation. However, outgroup potency, 
ingroup evaluation, and ingroup potency were not significantly impacted by the primes. 
Additionally, SEM revealed that transient self-evaluation was a significant mediator 
between self-uncertainty prime and outgroup evaluation. Thus, it does seem that self-
uncertainty caused inauthenticity, which was measured by decreased self-evaluation, 
which then resulted in a reduced outgroup evaluation (a behavior used to resolve 
inauthenticity by derogating the outgroup). Subsequent analyses revealed that self-
activity acted as a moderator for the self-uncertainty prime. In other words, those with 
higher self-activity at the start of the experiment were more likely to be impacted by the 
self-uncertainty prime (which is consistent with previous research finding self-esteem as 
a moderator for self-uncertainty).  
Despite outgroup evaluation being influenced by self-uncertainty, there were no 
significant changes between likelihood ratings of social events by condition. Participants 
in the self-uncertainty and self-affirmation conditions did not rate the likelihoods 
significantly different.  
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Democrats and Republicans are already heavily polarized as previous research 
and my baseline findings show. Thus, increasing or decreasing polarization in any degree 
is a challenging task. However, my results show that the contrast between affirming 
oneself and feeling uncertain results in more negative self-evaluations. Additionally, 
these more negative self-evaluations result in participants rating their political outgroup 
even more negatively than they normally would. While this did not impact how 
participants rated the likelihood of events, it does open up future research to applying a 
mathematical framework to self-sentiment change and intergroup feelings.  
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 2 
Methods 
Project Description 
 Study 2 measures how ego network homogeneity influences political polarization. 
Using the “important matters” measure, I collected ego network data from Republican 
and Democrat participants. This required participants to list up to six individuals they 
discuss “important matters” with and also indicate if the individuals listed shared their 
political identity or not. This allowed me to calculate the degree of political homogeneity 
in my participants’ personal networks. Like Study 1, I applied the ACT framework in my 
outcome variables capturing political polarization. This included the same EPA ratings 
for ingroups and outgroups as well as subjective likelihood judgements of events 
involving those groups. Additionally, I had measures of political extremism (how 
politically liberal or conservative my participants were) and also their agreement with 
certain political beliefs (climate change and socialism). Finally, I had measures of 
demographics (age, race, sex, education) and personality (openness and agreeableness).  
Study 2 Hypotheses 
There should be a strong partisanship bias for evaluation and potency of 
ingroups/outgroups as well as the likelihood of events for these groups, replicating the 
findings of Study 1. Thus, I should find support again for the Ingroup EP bias hypothesis, 
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Ingroup helping likelihood bias hypothesis, and Outgroup bullying likelihood bias 
hypothesis in Study 2 since I will have the same measures as Study 1.  
H1: Ingroup EP Bias: Individuals who self-identify with a political subgroup (p) will 
rate outgroup political identities significantly lower on EP than ingroup political 
identities  
 
H2a: Ingroup helping likelihood bias: Individuals who self-identify with a political 
subgroup (p) will rate their ingroup engaging in a good behavior as more likely than the 
outgroup 
 
H2b: Outgroup bullying likelihood bias: Individuals who self-identify with a political 
subgroup (p) will rate their outgroup engaging in a bad behavior as more likely than the 
ingroup 
 
Despite these existing strong partisanship biases, I predict that network 
homogeneity will increase these biases even further. To calculate ego network 
homogeneity, I applied Facciani and Brashears’ (2019) method of defining a 
homogeneous network as one that contains the shared political party between the 
respondent and all alters listed. The alters listed will be obtained from the name generator 
task where participants list up to six people they discuss “important matters” with. A 
heterogeneous network is defined as having at least one close tie identify as a political 
party different than the respondent. I predict that homogeneity will increase the 
evaluation and potency for one’s ingroup while decreasing it for their outgroups.  
H7a: Homogeneity increases ingroup EP: When one’s ego network has greater 
homogeneity of shared political ideology then there will be an increase of EP for 
ingroups 
H7b: Homogeneity decreases outgroup EP: When one’s ego network has greater 
homogeneity of shared political ideology then there will be a decrease of EP for 
outgroups 
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Additionally, homogeneity should increase the likelihood ratings of the ingroup 
doing a good behavior as well as the likelihood of the outgroup doing a bad behavior.  
H8a: Homogeneity increase ingroup helping likelihood:  Homogeneity will make 
ingroup rate situation more likely when ingroup is engaging in good behavior compared 
to outgroup 
H8b: Homogeneity increase outgroup bullying likelihood:  Homogeneity will make 
ingroup rate situation more likely when outgroup is engaging in bad behavior compared 
to ingroup 
I also predict that network homogeneity will increase the extreme level of 
liberal/conservative ideology. Again, these self-reported Democrats and Republicans 
should already have quite different levels of social and economic ideology (which I 
combined into one measure of overall political ideology), but I predict that homogeneity 
should still have a significant positive impact.  
H9: Homogeneity increases extremism hypothesis: When one’s ego network has greater 
homogeneity of shared political ideology then there will be an increase of strength in 
polarized political beliefs. 
Finally, I predict that feelings towards the outgroup and ingroups should impact 
how much agreement individuals have towards policies towards their outgroup. For 
example, Republicans who have more favorable views towards Democrats will be 
associated with greater agreement with climate change. Likewise, Democrats who have 
more favorable views towards Republicans will be associated with less support for 
socialism.  
H10a: Outgroup evaluation increases agreement hypothesis: Increased outgroup 
evaluation increases agreement with outgroup beliefs 
H10b: Ingroup evaluation decreases agreement hypothesis: Increased ingroup 
evaluation rating decreases agreement with outgroup beliefs 
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While homogeneity of one’s network could influence how partisans process 
information, it is important to control for personality traits that could be driving an effect. 
Openness and disagreeableness are positively associated with higher degrees of network 
turnover (Centellegher et al. 2017). Those who are open to new experiences and those 
who are disagreeable tend to be quicker with removing existing ties and creating new 
ones. Additionally, openness is associated with intellectual humility (“a willingness to 
recognize the limits of one’s knowledge and appreciate others’ intellectual strengths” 
p.140), which has been found to reduce political bias (Porter and Schumann 2018). The 
present study will also control for these variables and examine how the network 
composition of close ties impacts political polarization. Additional control variables 
include the number of alters reported and strength of ideology. These analyses will also 
be included in the supplemental results section.  
Subjects  
 Study 2, which also recruited participants from Prolific’s political database, 
required 200 participants (100 Democrats and 100 Republicans). Based on my analysis of 
General Social Survey (1985) data, I found that Democrats and Republicans are roughly 
split into homogeneous and heterogenous networks (Facciani & Brashears 2019). Thus, 
having 100 participants in each group provided sufficient network diversity. Study 2 took 
about 15 minutes to complete and participants were paid $2.10 for their time (also 
creating an $8.40 hourly rate).  
Procedure  
In addition to the same self-sentiments questions used in Study 1, participants 
answered six questions about their openness to experience and their agreeableness (see 
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Appendix E) that were counterbalanced to avoid any unwanted priming effects. 
Participants then listed up to six people with whom they discuss “important matters.” 
Once they listed these people, the participant also reported more information about the 
person named including their political affiliation and the type of relationship with the 
participant (see Appendix F). Network homogeneity was measured by shared political 
affiliation within one’s personal network.  
After completing the ego network questions, participants completed the same 
questions as Study 1 regarding ingroup/outgroup evaluation and likelihood ratings of 
intergroup behavior. However, Study 2 added two questions. The first, adopted from 
Nisbet, Cooper, and Garret (2015), measures how much the participant agrees with the 
science supporting human-caused climate change. The second, based on Newport’s 
(2012) finding that Democrats and Republicans significantly differ in their feelings 
towards socialism, asks how much the respondent supports socialist policies (see 
Appendix G). These questions measure two specific issues that are polarizing between 
Democrats and Republicans beyond general fiscal and social ideology measures. This 
allowed me to analyze potential links between feelings towards political groups and 
specific political beliefs. Finally, the participants completed the same demographic 
questions as in Study 1 and then were debriefed at the end of the study. 
As with Study 1, political ingroup members should rate their political outgroup 
significantly lower on evaluation compared to their ingroup. Identities rated negatively 
(the outgroup identities) should be rated as more likely to exhibit bad behavior and less 
likely to enact good behavior. Conversely, identities rated positively (the ingroup 
identities) should be rated as less likely to do bad behavior and more likely to do good 
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behavior. I also predict that feelings towards the outgroup and ingroup should impact 
how much agreement individuals have towards policies towards their outgroup. While 
Study 2 is not able to evaluate casual links with this design, the analyses will still reveal 
if there are meaningful associations between my measures of homogeneity, political bias, 
and political beliefs.  
Planned Analyses to Test Hypotheses 
Consistent with Study 1, I used a series of t-tests to determine if participants 
significantly rate their own political group (combining Democrats and Republicans) 
higher on evaluation and potency than their outgroup (H1: Ingroup EP bias hypothesis). I 
will also use t-tests to determine if participants rate the likelihood of their ingroup doing a 
good behavior (H2a: Ingroup helping likelihood bias) and their outgroup doing a bad 
behavior (H2b: Outgroup bullying likelihood bias). Next, I will use a series of ordinary 
least squared regression models to assess whether homogeneity was associated with an 
additional increase of political polarization. 
Homogeneity will be the main independent variable and will be generated as a 
contrast between having a fully homogenous personal network and having at least one 
member of one’s network have a different political identity than the participant. To 
evaluate H7a: Homogeneity increases ingroup EP and H7b: Homogeneity decreases 
outgroup EP, homogeneity will be the independent variable and the ingroup and 
outgroup sentiment ratings will be the outcome variables. To evaluate H8a: Homogeneity 
increase ingroup helping likelihood and H8b: Homogeneity increase outgroup bullying 
likelihood, homogeneity will be the independent variable and the likelihood ratings of 
social events will be the outcome variables. To avoid additional statistical analyses (and 
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the risk of increasing alpha error), I computed difference scores between the likelihood 
ratings of the ingroup and outgroup performing the same behavior. This allowed me to 
have a single difference score for helping and bullying behavior (which I labeled 
likelihood bias). For testing H9: Homogeneity increases extremism, homogeneity will be 
the dependent variable and political extremism will be the independent variable. Political 
extremism was measured by the combined social and economic scales of political belief 
(see Appendix C).  
H10a: Outgroup evaluation increases agreement and H10b: Ingroup evaluation 
decreases agreement will use outgroup evaluation and ingroup evaluation as the 
dependent variables respectively. Regression models will reveal if one’s 
ingroup/outgroup evaluation will be associated with holding beliefs common to political 
identity (climate change and socialism). I will also include party identification in my 
model to assess potential party effects via interactions between party identification and 
homogeneity. Finally, I will control for number of alters given, political ideology, and 
personality measures in all my models. Table 4.1 summarizes all the hypotheses for 
Study 2.  
 
Table 4.1. Hypothesis Summary List for Study 2. 
Study 2 Hypothesis  
H1: Ingroup EP Bias  
H2a: Ingroup helping 
likelihood bias 
H2b: Outgroup bullying 
likelihood bias 
H7a: Homogeneity increases 
ingroup EP 
H7b: Homogeneity decreases 
outgroup EP 
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H8a: Homogeneity increase 
ingroup helping likelihood 
H8b: Homogeneity increase 
outgroup bullying likelihood 
H9: Homogeneity increases 
extremism 
H10a: Outgroup evaluation 
increases agreement 
H10b: Ingroup evaluation 
decreases agreement 
 
Study 2 Results 
Evaluation, Potency, and Activity Ratings of Political Groups 
Study 2 also had participants rate their feelings towards political ingroups and 
outgroups on evaluation, potency, and activity. A series of t-tests confirmed if there was 
the same baseline difference between ingroup and outgroup evaluation, potency, and 
activity ratings found in Study 1. Individuals in the control group rated the ingroup higher 
on evaluation (t (382) = 20.31; p <.001; d = 2.07), potency (t (382) = 3.18; p < .01; d = 
0.324), and activity (t (382) = 6.28; p <.001; d = 0.413) compared to the outgroup (see 
Table 4.2). Consistent with Study 1, only the differences on evaluation had a high 
magnitude of effect. Potency had a small effect and activity had a medium effect. Thus, 
Study 2 also finds support for H1: Ingroup EP Bias hypothesis, that individuals will rate 
their political outgroup lower on evaluation and potency compared to their ingroup.  
These findings confirm that the measure of polarization is found in study 2’s 
sample. Now that this baseline polarization is established, I will check if network 
homogeneity could significantly change feelings between the groups.  
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Table 4.2. Comparison of ingroup and outgroup sentiment ratings in control condition via 
t-tests.  
Sentiment Ingroup  Outgroup 
Evaluation  1.93 (1.28) ** -1.32 (1.81) 
Potency 1.38 (1.40) ** 0.84 (1.85) 
Activity 0.658 (1.68) ** - 0.589 (2.17) 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
Likelihood Ratings of Political Group Behavior in Social Events 
 
 
Table 4.3. Comparison of ingroup and outgroup likelihood ratings in control condition 
via t-tests.  
 
Social Event Ingroup Likelihood 
Rating 
Outgroup 
Likelihood Rating 
Helping a Person 6.13 (0.916) ** 5.03 (1.64) 
Helping an outgroup (ingroup) 
member 
5.51 (1.21) ** 4.33 (1.75) 
Bullying a Person 4.40 (1.56) ** 5.78 (1.27) 
Bullying an outgroup (ingroup) 
member 
4.41 (1.61) ** 5.92 (1.26) 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
 
In addition to measuring differences on evaluation, potency, and activity, Study 2 
also had participants rate the likelihood of social events involving political ingroup and 
outgroup members (Table 4.3). Ingroup members rated the likelihood of their group 
helping a person as significantly more likely than outgroup members helping a person (t 
(384) = 8.09; p <.001; d = 0.826)). Ingroup members also rated the likelihood of their 
group helping an outgroup member as significantly greater than outgroup members 
helping an ingroup member (t (384) = 7.68; p <.001; d = 0.784)) Additionally, both have 
somewhat large magnitudes of effects.  
Ingroup members rated the likelihood of their outgroup bullying a person as 
significantly more likely than ingroup members bullying a person (t (384) = 9.43; p 
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<.001; d = 0.962). Ingroup members also rated the likelihood of their outgroup bullying 
an ingroup member as significantly more likely than ingroup members bullying an 
outgroup member (t (384) = 10.21; p <.001; d = 1.042)). As with the helping bias, these 
bullying bias assessments have large magnitudes of effects. These findings are consistent 
with Study 1 and find that individuals rate their ingroup as more likely to engage in 
helping behaviors and the outgroup as more likely to engage in bullying behaviors 
(supporting H2a: Ingroup helping likelihood bias and H2b: Outgroup bullying likelihood 
bias again). This shows that these likelihood ratings do capture significant political bias 
between Democrats and Republicans. As with the sentiment ratings between groups, I 
will measure if network homogeneity significantly changes this baseline polarization 
between the groups as well.  
 
The Influence of Network Homogeneity on Political Group Ratings 
Table 4.4. Ordinary Least Squared Regression models predicting ingroup and outgroup 
ratings as a function of network homogeneity.  
 
 
Ingroup 
Evaluation 
Ingroup 
Potency 
Outgroup 
Evaluation 
Outgroup 
Potency 
Network 
Homogeneity  
0.820** 
(2.96) 
0.555~ 
(1.84) 
-0.843* 
(-2.26) 
-0.758* 
(-1.99) 
Number of 
Alters 
-0.074 
(-1.20) 
-0.074 
(-1.09) 
0.129 
(1.53) 
0.099 
(1.15) 
Higher 
Conservatism 
-0.106 
(-1.23) 
-0.195* 
(-2.08) 
-0.030 
(-0.26) 
0.081 
(0.69) 
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Democrat 
Identification 
-0.660 
(-0.18) 
-1.06** 
(-2.71) 
-0.938~ 
(-1.93) 
1.408**     
(2.84) 
Democrat and 
Homogeneity 
Interaction 
-0.991** 
(-2.63) 
-0.124 
(-0.30) 
0.010 
(0.02) 
0.614 
(1.17) 
 
Constant  
 
2.624** 
(4.45) 
 
2.816** 
(4.39) 
 
-0.996 
(-1.25) 
 
-0.483             
(-0.60) 
 
N 
 
192 
 
192 
 
192 
 
192 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
Regression analyses revealed the impact of having a completely homogenous 
network on evaluation and potency ratings of ingroups and outgroups (see Table 4.4). 
Those with a completely homogenous network were significantly more likely to rate their 
ingroup more positively (p = .003). The interaction term had a significant negative 
association with the ingroup evaluation score (p = .009). This suggests Republicans with 
increased homogeneity favor their own group more than Democrats. This does not 
necessarily suggest that Democrats do not have an ingroup favoritism effect however.  
Network homogeneity was associated with a higher rating of ingroup potency (p = 
.034; one tailed). Identifying as a Democrat is negatively associated with ingroup potency 
(p = .007). This suggests that being a Republican is associated with rating one’s ingroup 
higher on potency and this is consistent with previous work showing that Republicans 
favor competence. These findings support H7a: Homogeneity increases ingroup EP.  
Moving along to outgroup ratings, I find that outgroup evaluation was negatively 
associated with having a completely homogeneous network (p = .025). Outgroup potency 
was also negatively associated with network homogeneity (p = .048). Identifying as a 
Democrat was also associated with higher outgroup potency ratings (p = .005). These 
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results support H7b: Homogeneity decreases outgroup EP. Next, I will test if 
homogeneity also influenced the likelihood ratings of social events involving political 
groups. 
The Influence of Network Homogeneity on Likelihood Ratings of Social Events 
Table 4.5. Ordinary Least Squared Regression models predicting likelihood ratings of 
ingroup and outgroup social events as a function of network homogeneity.  
 
Ingroup 
Help 
Person Bias 
Ingroup 
Help 
Outgroup 
Bias 
Outgroup 
Help 
Person Bias 
Outgroup 
Bully Ingroup 
Bias 
Network 
Homogeneity  
0.537** 
(2.88) 
0.657** 
(3.65) 
0.124 
(0.32) 
-0.163 
(-0.39) 
Number of 
Alters 
-0.097* 
(-2.31) 
-0.078~ 
(-1.91) 
-0.064 
(-0.73) 
-0.117 
(-1.24) 
Higher 
Conservatism 
-0.003 
(-0.06) 
0.011 
(0.20) 
0.230~ 
(1.88) 
-0.016 
(-0.12) 
Democrat 
Identification 
-0.153 
(-0.60) 
0.935 
(0.234) 
0.874~ 
(1.72) 
0.179     
(0.33) 
Democrat and 
Homogeneity 
Interaction 
0.190 
(0.79) 
-0.446~ 
(-1.80) 
0.610 
(1.14) 
0.696 
(1.20) 
 
Constant  
 
0.743~ 
(1.87) 
 
0.707~ 
(1.84) 
 
0.168 
(0.20) 
 
1.947*             
(2.17) 
 
N 
 
192 
 
192 
 
192 
 
192 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
Regression analyses revealed (see Table 4.5) that having a homogenous network 
was associated with having a higher ingroup helping person bias (p = .004). The number 
of alters given was also significant and negatively associated with ingroup bias (p = .022) 
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suggesting that bigger networks make a difference. This could be because as more people 
are added, it is more likely there will be diversity. The interaction effect between party 
identification and homogeneity was not significant, suggesting that neither party is 
significantly more likely to be affected by this effect. 
Ingroup bias for helping an outgroup member was also positively associated with 
having a homogenous network (p <.001) suggesting that ingroup members rate their 
ingroup as more likely to help an outgroup member with a completely homogenous 
network. The interaction term was also significant with a one-tailed test and negative (p = 
.037), suggesting Republicans with a homogeneous network think it is more likely their 
ingroup would help the outgroup more than Democrats. However, this is only one-tailed 
suggesting a weak effect. Homogeneity for this variable had a weaker effect for 
Democrats than Republicans. 
Network homogeneity was significantly associated with both ingroup bias for 
helping a person as well as an outgroup member. Thus, H8a: Homogeneity increase 
ingroup helping likelihood is supported. 
Having a homogenous network was not associated with having higher outgroup 
helping a person bias (p = .751). However, both higher conservatism (p <.061) and 
identifying as a Democrat (p = .087) approached significance. When control variables 
were dropped in a reduced model (see Table 4.6), network homogeneity and outgroup 
bullying a person bias was significant (p = .041). This suggests that political beliefs may 
overwhelm the network effects due to a lack of statistical power.  
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Table 4.6. Reduced Ordinary Least Squared regression model predicting likelihood 
ratings of outgroup helping a person bias social events as a function of network 
homogeneity.  
 
Outgroup 
Bully 
Person Bias 
Network 
Homogeneity  
0.544* 
(2.06) 
 
Constant  
 
1.156** 
(6.91) 
 
N 
 
192 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
Finally, having a homogenous network was not associated with having higher 
outgroup bullying an ingroup member bias (p = .700). This effect still was nonsignificant 
even after dropping control variables (p = 0.278). Thus, ingroup members with 
homogenous networks were more likely to have a bias for the outgroup bullying a person, 
but not an ingroup member. Thus, H8b: Homogeneity increase outgroup bullying 
likelihood is only partially supported. 
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The Impact of Network Homogeneity on Extreme Conservative and Liberal Beliefs 
Table 4.7. Ordinal Logistic Regression models predicting extreme conservative (or 
liberal) beliefs and network homogeneity for all participants, Republicans only, and 
Democrats only.  
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
 Higher 
Conservative 
Ideology 
Higher 
Conservative 
Ideology 
(Republicans) 
Higher Liberal 
Ideology 
(Democrats) 
  
Network 
Homogeneity  
1.031* 
(2.55) 
0.980* 
(2.41) 
0.502 
(1.37) 
  
Number of 
Alters 
-0.058 
(-0.66) 
-0.142 
(-1.05) 
-0.005 
(-0.05) 
  
Democrat vs 
Republicans 
Identification 
-4.849** 
(-8.49) 
    
Democrat vs 
Republican and 
Homogeneity 
Interaction 
-1.530** 
(-2.83) 
    
 
Cut 1 
 
-6.485 
 
-4.31 
 
 1.33 
  
Cut 2 -5.951 -3.601  0.874   
Cut 3 -4.728 -3.363 -0.381   
Cut 4 -4.265 -2.296 -0.874   
Cut 5 -3.489 -1.759 -1.883   
Cut 6 -3.168 -1.288 -2.384   
Cut 7 -1.881 -0.744 -4.395   
Cut 8 -1.302  0.990    
Cut 9 -0.838  1.421    
Cut 10 -0.301     
Cut 11 1.417     
Cut 12 1.847     
N 192 95 97   
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So far, my measures of political bias included group sentiment ratings and social 
event likelihood ratings. I also wanted to assess if different political beliefs were 
influenced by network composition as well. Table 4.7 reveals how ingroup members have 
higher conservatism with a completely homogenous network (p = .011). Democrats also 
rated themselves significantly less conservative (p <.001) than Republicans. The 
interaction term between Democrats and homogeneity is also significant in the negative 
direction (p <.001), suggesting that Democrats with homogenous networks tend to be 
even less favorable to conservatism than Democrats without homogenous networks.  
Next, I separated Democrats and Republicans (Table 4.7) to see if homogeneity 
increased polarized beliefs for both political groups. For Democrats, network 
homogeneity was positively associated with more extreme liberal ideology, however, it 
did not reach significance (p = 0.172). For Republicans, network homogeneity was 
significantly positively associated with higher conservativism (p = 0.016). Thus, having a 
homogenous network increased general ideological strength for Republicans, but not for 
Democrats. Because this was significant in Republicans only, H9: Homogeneity 
increases extremism is partially supported.  
The Impact of Ingroup and Outgroup Evaluation on Political Beliefs 
In addition to network homogeneity, I tested if feelings towards one’s political 
ingroup and outgroup could impact their political beliefs (see Table 4.8). Regression 
analysis revealed that outgroup evaluation had a significant positive association with 
agreeing with climate change (p =.005). Identifying as a Democrat also was positively 
associated with agreeing with climate change (p <.01) and the interaction was negatively 
associated and significant (p < .05).  This indicates that Democrats who evaluate 
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Republicans more favorably are less likely to agree that climate change is caused by 
humans. This also means that Republicans who view Democrats more favorably were 
associated with a high likelihood of agreeing with human-caused climate change. The 
marginal plot in Figure 4.1 illustrates how Republicans agree more with climate change 
when they have more positive views of Democrats.   
Table 4.8. Ordinal Logistic Regression models predicting outgroup evaluation as a 
function of ideological beliefs.  
 
 
Climate 
Change 
Agreement  
Socialism 
Agreement 
Higher 
Conservatism 
Network 
Homogeneity  
0.382 
(1.17) 
0.025 
(0.09) 
0.322 
(1.15) 
Number of 
Alters 
-0.014 
(-0.14) 
-0.116 
(-1.24) 
-0.044 
(-0.50) 
Higher 
Conservatism 
-0.146 
(-1.05) 
-0.372** 
(-2.88) 
 
Outgroup 
Evaluation 
0.425** 
(3.94) 
0.161 
(1.61) 
-0.297**      
(-2.81) 
Democrat 
Identification 
2.004** 
(3.56) 
1.305* 
(2.55) 
-4.455** 
(-7.81) 
 
Democrat and 
Outgroup 
Evaluation 
Interaction 
 
-0.436* 
(-2.41) 
 
-0.271 
(-1.57) 
 
0.878**             
(5.05) 
Cut 1 -3.12 -3.92 -6.84 
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Cut 2 
Cut 3 
Cut 4 
Cut 5 
Cut 6 
Cut 7 
Cut 8 
Cut 9 
Cut 10 
Cut 11 
Cut 12 
-2.558 
-2.179 
-1.721 
-0.758 
 0.620 
-3.43 
-2.998 
-2.307 
-0.867 
 0.149 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.55 
-4.917 
-4.388 
-3.521 
-3.173 
-1.847 
-1.247 
-0.758 
-0.201 
1.536 
1.969 
N 192 192 192 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
Figure 4.1. Marginal plot of climate change agreement and outgroup evaluation between 
Democrats and Republicans. 95% CI 
Next, I find that socialism is positively associated with identifying as a Democrat 
(p = .011) and negatively associated with conservatism (p = .004). Outgroup evaluation 
(p = .107) and the interaction term between Democrat identification and outgroup 
evaluation (p = .107) both approached significance for their impact on socialism. To 
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increase my statistical power, I removed political ideology in a separate model (see Table 
4.9). I found that both outgroup evaluation (p = .034) and the interaction term (p = .011) 
became significant. This provides support that Democrats who evaluate Republicans 
more favorably are less likely to agree that socialism can be beneficial.  
Table 4.9. Reduced Ordinal Logistic regression models predicting outgroup evaluation as 
a function of socialism agreement.  
 
 
Socialism 
Agreement 
Network 
Homogeneity  
-.0359 
(-0.13) 
Number of 
Alters 
-0.095 
(-1.02) 
Outgroup 
Evaluation 
0.209* 
(2.11) 
Democrat 
Identification 
2.281** 
(5.85) 
 
Democrat and 
Outgroup 
Evaluation 
Interaction 
 
-0.420* 
(-2.53) 
Cut 1 -1.78 
Cut 2 
Cut 3 
Cut 4 
Cut 5 
Cut 6 
-1.30 
-0.875 
-0.201 
1.181 
2.164 
N 192 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
86 
For ideological extremism, outgroup evaluation (p < .001) and identifying as a 
Democrat (p < .001) were negatively associated with conservatism. The interaction term 
was significant and positively associated with higher conservatism (p <.001). Because I 
used Democrat identification in my interaction term with outgroup evaluation, this 
indicates that Democrats who evaluate Republicans more favorably are more likely to 
have stronger conservative beliefs. This also means that Republicans who view 
Democrats more favorably will have weaker conservative beliefs.  
Table 4.10. Ordinal Logistic Regression models predicting ingroup evaluation as a 
function of ideological beliefs.  
 
 
Climate 
Change 
Agreement  
Socialism 
Agreement 
Higher 
Conservatism 
Network 
Homogeneity  
0.160 
(0.51) 
-0.036 
(-0.13) 
0.142 
(0.53) 
Number of 
Alters 
0.659 
(0.64) 
-0.093 
(-1.01) 
-0.079 
(-0.89) 
Higher 
Conservatism 
-0.282* 
(-2.21) 
-0.423** 
(-3.44) 
 
Ingroup 
Evaluation 
-0.038 
(-0.28) 
0.163 
(1.19) 
0.184      
(1.30) 
Democrat 
Identification 
1.297* 
(1.98) 
1.832* 
(2.83) 
-4.548** 
(-6.71) 
 
Democrat and 
Ingroup 
Evaluation 
Interaction 
 
0.334 
(1.39) 
 
-0.189 
(-0.85) 
 
-0.449~             
(-1.94) 
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Cut 1 -3.138 -3.665 -6.515 
Cut 2 
Cut 3 
Cut 4 
Cut 5 
Cut 6 
Cut 7 
Cut 8 
Cut 9 
Cut 10 
Cut 11 
Cut 12 
-2.641 
-2.308 
-1.889 
-0.995 
0.3205 
-3.188 
-2.757 
-2.058 
-0.605 
0.405 
-5.986 
-4.764 
-4.300 
-3.517 
-3.191 
-1.900 
-1.335 
-0.883 
-0.356 
1.312 
1.736 
N 192 192 192 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
The above findings show that feelings towards one’s political outgroup 
significantly influenced climate change agreement, socialism agreement, and ideological 
extremism. This supports H10a: Outgroup evaluation increases agreement. I also wanted 
to evaluate whether feelings for one’s own political ingroup could influence these beliefs 
as well (see Table 4.10). Ingroup evaluation was not significantly associated with any 
climate change (p = .782) socialism (p = .233), or conservatism (p = .194). For 
ideological belief, there was a significant effect for the interaction term between 
identifying as a Democrat and ingroup evaluation (p =.026; one-tailed). Because this was 
negative, it means that Democrats who evaluate Democrats more favorably are less likely 
to have stronger conservative beliefs. This also means that Republicans who view 
Republicans more favorably will have stronger conservative beliefs. However, ingroup 
evaluation was not a significant mediator between network homogeneity and ideological 
beliefs. Thus, H10b: Ingroup evaluation decreases agreement was not supported. Table 
4.11 displays results summary of hypothesis outcomes.  
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Table 4.11. Summary of Hypotheses Outcomes for Study 2 
Study 2 Hypothesis  Result 
H1: Ingroup EP Bias  ✓  
H2a: Ingroup helping likelihood bias ✓  
H2b: Outgroup bullying likelihood bias ✓  
H7a: Homogeneity increases ingroup EP ✓  
H7b: Homogeneity decreases outgroup EP ✓  
H8a: Homogeneity increase ingroup helping 
likelihood 
✓  
H8b: Homogeneity increase outgroup 
bullying likelihood 
PS. Only significant for outgroup 
bullying person  
 
H9: Homogeneity increases extremism PS. Only significant for Republicans 
H10a: Outgroup evaluation increases 
agreement 
✓  
H10b: Ingroup evaluation decreases 
agreement 
  
Note: = not supported. ✓ = fully supported. PS = Partially supported.  
Supplemental Analyses  
The above results show how network homogeneity (as a binary variable) was 
associated with various measures of polarization. However, these subsequent analyses 
include network homogeneity as a matter of proportion (percentage of alters sharing the 
respondent’s political identity).7 Because this does not separate homogeneity into all or 
nothing categories, the results may not be as strong, but they should still yield similar 
findings.  
 
 
 
 
 
7 Overall, 40% of my sample had completely homogeneous networks. There was not a 
significant difference in homogeneity between Democrats and Republicans.  
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Table 4.12. Ordinary Least Squared Regression models predicting ingroup and outgroup 
ratings as a function of proportional network homogeneity.  
 
Ingroup 
Evaluation 
Ingroup 
Potency 
Outgroup 
Evaluation 
Outgroup 
Potency 
Proportional 
Network 
Homogeneity  
1.265* 
(2.57) 
0.858 
(1.60) 
-1.181~ 
(-1.76) 
-1.232~ 
(-1.83) 
Number of 
Alters 
-0.080 
(-1.28) 
-0.090 
(-1.33) 
0.159~ 
(1.87) 
0.111 
(1.30) 
Higher 
Conservatism 
-0.085 
(-1.00) 
-0.192* 
(-2.05) 
-0.035 
(-0.30) 
0.071 
(0.61) 
Democrat 
Identification 
0.736 
(1.17) 
-0.705 
(-1.03) 
-1.097~ 
(-1.28) 
0.587     
(0.68) 
Democrat and 
Homogeneity 
Interaction 
-1.525** 
(-2.07) 
-0.5354 
(-0.67) 
0.206 
(0.21) 
1.380 
(1.37) 
 
Constant  
 
1.927** 
(2.91) 
 
2.467** 
(3.42) 
 
-0.575 
(-0.64) 
 
0.120             
(0.13) 
 
N 
 
192 
 
192 
 
192 
 
192 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
Proportion homogeneity was associated with higher ingroup evaluation, lower 
outgroup evaluation, and lower outgroup potency (see Table 4.12). Ingroup potency was 
not significant, but the means were in the predicted direction. Each of the standardized t-
values were smaller than the results using the binary homogeneity measure. Thus, 
proportion homogeneity still can produce significant effects, but they effects are weaker.  
To help visualize this proportional effect, I included a marginal plot between the 
outgroup evaluation rating and network homogeneity (Figure 4.2). This illustrates how 
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both Republicans and Democrats have decreased outgroup evaluations associated with 
increased network homogeneity.  
 
Figure 4.2 Marginal plot of outgroup evaluation and proportional network homogeneity. 
95% CI 
Table 4.13 Ordinary Least Squared Regression models predicting likelihood ratings of 
ingroup and outgroup social events as a function of proportional network homogeneity.  
 
Ingroup 
Help 
Person Bias 
Ingroup 
Help 
Outgroup 
Bias 
Outgroup 
Bully 
Person Bias 
Outgroup 
Bully Ingroup 
Bias 
Proportional 
Network 
Homogeneity  
0.620~ 
(1.85) 
0.685* 
(2.10) 
-0.183 
(-0.53) 
-0.567 
(-0.76) 
Number of 
Alters 
-0.113* 
(-2.65) 
-0.092* 
(-2.22) 
-0.043 
(-0.98) 
-0.129 
(-1.37) 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
O
u
tg
ro
u
p
 E
v
a
lu
a
ti
o
n
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Network Homogeneity
Republicans Democrats
91 
Higher 
Conservatism 
0.005 
(0.09) 
0.028 
(0.50) 
-0.115~ 
(-1.90) 
-0.020 
(-0.16) 
Democrat 
Identification 
0.290 
(0.68) 
0.292 
(0.70) 
0.117 
(0.26) 
-0.719 
(-0.75) 
Democrat and 
Homogeneity 
Interaction 
-0.180 
(-0.36) 
-0.425 
(-0.87) 
0.601 
(1.16) 
1.545 
(1.39) 
 
Constant  
 
0.521 
(1.15) 
 
0.424 
(0.97) 
 
0.285 
(0.61) 
 
2.371* 
(2.37) 
 
N 
 
192 
 
192 
 
192 
 
192 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
As with ingroup and outgroup sentiments, proportion homogeneity had weaker 
effects on the ingroup biases for likelihood of social events as well (see Table 4.13). 
Proportion homogeneity was still associated with an ingroup help and ingroup help 
person and ingroup help outgroup bias. However, the outgroup bully person bias was not 
significant, even when removing controls. The t-values were also slightly smaller using 
the proportion homogeneity measure. Thus, proportion homogeneity still has significant 
effects for political bias, but they are not as strong.  
While network homogeneity increased the likelihood ratings of ingroup helping 
an outgroup, I also tested if homogeneity influenced how participant’s felt about political 
groups, which subsequently produced this bias. SEM analyses (see Table 4.14) revealed 
that outgroup evaluation acts as a mediator between (binary) homogeneity and ingroup 
help person bias because it has both a significant indirect (p <.001) and direct effect (p 
<.001).  
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Table 4.14. Mediation results for outgroup evaluation and ingroup potency on ingroup 
help outgroup bias.  
 Path A 
(direct) 
Network 
homogeneity 
→ Ingroup 
Help 
Outgroup 
Bias 
Path B 
(indirect) 
Network 
Homogeneity 
→Outgroup 
Evaluation  
 
Path C 
Network 
(indirect) 
homogeneity 
→ Ingroup 
Evaluation 
 
 
Path D 
Outgroup 
(direct) 
Evaluation 
→ Ingroup 
Help 
Outgroup 
Bias 
 
Path E  
Ingroup 
(direct) 
Evaluation 
→Ingroup 
Help Bias 
 
Constant 
  
0.513* 
(2.25) 
 
-1.002** 
(-3.92) 
 
0.299 
(1.60) 
 
-0.440** 
(-7.14) 
 
0.242* 
(2.88) 
 
-0.157 
(-0.74) 
 
N 
 
192 
 
192 
 
192 
 
192 
 
192 
 
192 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
Ingroup evaluation did not act as a mediator because it had a nonsignificant 
indirect effect (p = .110) but a significant direct effect (p =.025).  Homogeneity did not 
have a significant effect on the ingroup bullying the outgroup I did not run mediation 
tests. Thus, for the ingroup helping an outgroup measurement, outgroup evaluation acted 
as a mediating variable between homogeneity and the likelihood bias. 
Table 4.15. Ordinal Logistic Regression models predicting extreme conservative beliefs 
and proportional network homogeneity for all participants, Republicans only, and 
Democrats only.  
 
 Higher 
Conservative 
Ideology 
Higher 
Conservative 
Ideology 
(Republicans) 
Higher 
Liberal 
Ideology 
(Democrats) 
  
Proportional 
Network 
Homogeneity  
1.002 
(1.43) 
0.933 
(1.33) 
0.789 
(1.13) 
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* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
Proportion homogeneity had a nonsignificant effect on ideological extremism (see 
Table 4.15). This was true for both Democrats and Republicans (for the binary 
homogeneity measure, this effect was significant in Republicans). The means are in the 
predicted directions, so this suggests that the effect is again weaker, but a larger sample 
size could yield significance.  
Number of 
Alters 
-0.068 
(-0.77) 
-0.179 
(-1.35) 
-0.021 
(-0.18) 
  
Democrat 
Identification 
-4.005** 
(-4.45) 
 1.645   
Republican 
Identification 
 -4.117    
Democrat 
and 
Homogeneity 
Interaction 
-1.819** 
(-1.84) 
 1.187 
 
  
 
Republican 
and 
Homogeneity 
Interaction 
  
-3.399 
 
   
Cut 1 -6.099 -3.162 -0.072   
Cut 2 -5.563 -2.099 -0.561   
Cut 3 -4.336 -1.568 -1.553   
Cut 4 -3.877 -1.105 -2.047   
Cut 5 -3.112 -0.579 -4.052   
Cut 6 -2.795 1.082    
Cut 7 -1.512 1.503     
Cut 8 -.9399     
Cut 9 -.4852     
Cut 10 0.0315     
Cut 11 1.669     
Cut 12 2.088     
N 192 95 97   
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Mediation Results Between Political Group Sentiments and Political Beliefs  
I also wanted to check if political group ratings also had mediating effects for 
extreme political beliefs. This would show if homogeneity influenced feelings towards 
the outgroup, which then in turn influenced political beliefs. I used SEM to identify if 
outgroup evaluation were mediators between (binary) homogeneity8 and extreme beliefs 
for Democrats and Republicans.  
For Republicans only (Table 4.16), outgroup evaluation had both significant 
direct (p < .05) and indirect effects (p <.01). This suggests that outgroup evaluation acts 
as a mediator between network homogeneity and conservatism. In order words, 
Republicans who have a completely homogeneous network have less favorable feelings 
towards Democrats, which in turn also is associated with stronger conservative beliefs.9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 I used the binary measure of homogeneity here since that was the method used in my 
main analyses.  
9 Using the same SEM process, I tested if outgroup evaluation was a significant mediator 
for socialism and climate change beliefs. For Republicans, outgroup evaluation was a 
significant mediator between homogeneity and political beliefs. This shows that 
Republicans who had homogenous networks had more negative views towards 
Democrats, and those negative views were associated with being less likely to agree with 
climate change and socialism beliefs. Outgroup evaluation did not act as a significant 
mediator for Democrats for climate change and socialism beliefs.   
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Table 4.16. Mediation results for outgroup evaluation on extreme ideological beliefs for 
Republicans.  
 Path A 
(direct) 
Network 
homogeneity 
→ 
Conservative 
Beliefs 
Path B 
(indirect) 
Network 
Homogeneity 
→Outgroup 
Evaluation  
 
Path C 
Outgroup 
(direct) 
Evaluation 
→ 
Conservative 
Beliefs 
 
Constant 
  
0.463~ 
(1.76) 
 
-0.915* 
(-2.19) 
 
-0.171** 
(-2.67) 
 
5.286** 
(24.00) 
 
N 
 
95 
 
95 
 
95 
 
95 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
 
Table 4.17. Mediation results for outgroup evaluation on extreme ideological beliefs for 
Democrats.  
 Path A 
(direct) 
Network 
homogeneity 
→ 
Conservative 
Beliefs 
Path B 
(indirect) 
Network 
Homogeneity 
→Outgroup 
Evaluation  
 
Path C 
Outgroup 
(direct) 
Evaluation 
→ 
Conservative 
Beliefs 
 
Constant 
  
0.032 
(0.18) 
 
-0.900 
(-3.17) 
 
0.233 ** 
(3.87) 
 
2.70** 
(13.48) 
 
N 
 
97 
 
97 
 
97 
 
97 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
For Democrats only (Table 4.17), outgroup evaluation also had both significant 
direct (p < .01) and indirect effects (p < .01). However, network homogeneity did not 
have significant effect on conservative beliefs (p > .05), so outgroup evaluation does not 
act as a mediator between network homogeneity and conservatism. Because the mean 
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was in the predicted direction for homogeneity, it is possible that with a larger sample 
size it would have statistically significant.  
Controlling for Personality Differences and Political Identity Prominence 
Table 4.18. Ordinary Least Squared Regression models predicting ingroup and outgroup 
ratings as a function of network homogeneity; while controlling for openness and 
agreeableness.  
 
Ingroup 
Evaluation 
Ingroup 
Potency 
Outgroup 
Evaluation 
Outgroup 
Potency 
Network 
Homogeneity  
0.775** 
(2.81) 
0.510~ 
(1.70) 
-0.857* 
(-2.28) 
-0.785* 
(-2.04) 
Number of 
Alters 
-0.082 
(-1.33) 
-0.082 
(-1.22) 
0.124 
(1.47) 
0.095 
(1.11) 
Higher 
Conservatism 
-0.109 
(-1.28) 
-0.200* 
(-2.15) 
-0.035 
(-0.31) 
0.081 
(0.69) 
Democrat 
Identification 
-0.668 
(-0.19) 
-1.04** 
(-2.67) 
-0.887~ 
(-1.81) 
1.383**     
(2.75) 
Democrat and 
Homogeneity 
Interaction 
-0.994** 
(-2.63) 
-0.127 
(-0.31) 
-0.331 
(-0.06) 
0.628 
(1.19) 
 
Openness  
 
 
Agreeableness 
 
0.135~ 
(1.66) 
 
0.129 
(1.41) 
 
0.134 
(1.51) 
 
0.168~ 
(1.69) 
 
0.037 
(0.34) 
 
0.164 
(0.188) 
 
0.082 
(0.73) 
 
0.018 
(0.15) 
 
Constant  
 
1.286** 
(1.57) 
 
2.816** 
(4.39) 
 
-2.033~ 
(-1.82) 
 
-0.989             
(-0.86) 
 
N 
 
192 
 
192 
 
192 
 
192 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
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Table 4.19. Logistic Regression model showing Party Identification Effects on Openness 
and Agreeable   
 
Democrat vs 
Republican 
Identification  
 
Openness  
 
 
Agreeableness 
 
0.364* 
(2.54) 
 
-0.510** 
(-3.18) 
 
Constant  
 
0.751 
(0.73) 
 
N 
 
192 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
While controlling for openness and agreeableness, I found that the network 
homogeneity remained significant (Table 4.18). Neither openness nor agreeableness had 
a significant effect (p >.05) on ingroup or outgroup scores.10 Identifying as a Democrat 
was associated with higher openness scores (see Table 4.19), which is consistent with 
previous work (McCann 2014). Agreeableness is associated with being a Republican, 
which is consistent with work finding Republicans having higher politeness (Hirsh et al 
2010).11  
 
10 Frequency of discussion and type of relationship did not have a significant impact on 
my results either. However, a larger sample may be required to account for these types of 
effects given the variance in responses.  
11I also tested if party identification could influence sentiment rating for my neutral 
concepts (and had double the sample of Study 1’s control condition). I found that person 
was no longer rated more positively, but was still rated more powerful (p = 0.48) when 
the participant is a Republican. Additionally, Bully was no longer rated more active when 
the participant was a Democrat. However, Democrats rated “bully” significantly more 
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I also checked if the importance of one’s political identity was different between 
Democrats and Republicans. There was not a significant difference in political identity 
importance (p > .05) with both groups having moderate identity importance (Democrats = 
2.75; Republicans 2.97) on a scale of 1-5 (5 being very important and 1 being not 
important at all). Interestingly, regression analysis showed that network homogeneity was 
significantly associated with higher political identity prominence (p = .015), suggesting 
those with politically homogenous networks have higher political identity prominence. 
Finally, as an exploratory bridge between Study 1 and Study 2, I measured the 
relationship between fundamental self-EPA and network homogeneity. Using OLS 
regression, I found that self-potency (p = .033) and self-activity (p = .026) were 
positively associated with having a more homogenous network for Republicans. For 
Democrats, only self-evaluation approached significance with being positively associated 
with network homogeneity (p = .099). This suggests a possible link between self-
sentiments and network composition, though causality will need to be determined in 
future research. 
Table 4.20. Correlations between Likelihood Rating of Social Scenario and Deflection 
Scores in Control Group 
Social Scenario Involving Ingroups or 
Outgroups 
Correlation with Deflection and 
Likelihood  
Ingroup Help Person 0.108 
Ingroup Help Outgroup 0.034 
 
negatively than Republicans (p = .007). These findings are largely similar to those of 
Study 1. These results are exploratory and offer a potential avenue for future research.  
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Ingroup Bully Person -.288** 
Ingroup Bully Outgroup -0.214** 
Outgroup Help Person -0.195** 
Outgroup Bully Person  -0.061 
Outgroup Help Ingroup -0.268** 
Outgroup Bully Ingroup -0.002 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ~ p<0.05, one-tailed 
As in Study 1, I tested the correlation between the computed deflection score and 
the likelihood ratings. Consistent with Study 1, I found that 4/8 were significantly 
associated (see Table 4.20). Importantly, the same four social events were significant in 
both studies. This suggests these social events are specific enough to capture how likely 
an event is to occur from deflection scores alone. 
Discussion: Study 2 
As found in study 1, the ingroup ratings of evaluation, potency, and activity were 
significantly different compared to the political outgroup. The likelihood ratings of the 
ingroup doing a good behavior and the outgroup doing a bullying behavior were also 
significantly different. Study 1 focused on individual emotions influencing political 
polarization. Study 2 investigated how having a homogenous personal network would 
impact the same measures.  
Participants with completely homogenous ego networks rated their political 
ingroup as more positive and more potent. Participants with completely homogenous ego 
networks also rated their political outgroup as less positive and less potent. Thus, network 
homogeneity did influence how participants felt about ingroups and outgroups. The 
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feelings of goodness/badness reflect how warm participants feel about these groups and 
the potency reflects how competent they are (i.e. how likely are they to carry out goals).  
Network homogeneity also increased the likelihood that ingroup members would 
rate their ingroup as more likely to help a person and help an outgroup member. 
Outgroup evaluation was a significant mediator between network homogeneity and 
likelihood ratings. Thus, having a completely homogenous network decreased one’s 
feelings of the outgroup, which in turn impacted how likely they thought they were to 
engage in helping behaviors.  
Additionally, network homogeneity increased the likelihood of participants rating 
the outgroup bullying a person, but not an ingroup member. Consistent with helping 
behavior likelihood, outgroup evaluation was a significant mediator between 
homogeneity and likelihood rating bias. It is possible that ingroup bullying outgroup vs 
outgroup bullying ingroup were seen as more likely behaviors and thus homogeneity did 
not have as strong of an impact since there was less separation between the two events.  
I also found that network homogeneity also increased conservative beliefs. 
However, once I separated my participants into Democrats and Republicans, I only found 
that Republicans had significantly stronger ideological beliefs with a homogeneous 
network. Democrats also had slightly stronger liberal beliefs in a homogenous network, 
but the effect did not reach significance.  
Next, I measured if outgroup evaluation would impact how individuals felt about 
different outgroup beliefs. I found that climate change and socialism beliefs both were 
more likely to be agreed with when Republicans had more positive views of Democrats. 
Conversely, climate change and socialism beliefs were less likely to be upheld by 
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Democrats when they have more positive views of Republicans. Additionally, 
Republicans were less likely to have stronger conservative beliefs when they had more 
positive views towards Democrats and that Democrats were more likely to have 
conservative beliefs when they have positive views towards Republicans. For climate 
change and general ideological belief, outgroup evaluation was a mediator between 
homogeneity and these beliefs. Thus, having just one close tie of a different political 
identity than an individual increases your evaluation towards the political outgroup; 
which in turn makes it more likely one support beliefs against their party. Finally, I found 
that ingroup evaluation did not have a significant effect on political beliefs.  
Overall, network homogeneity does seem to have robust effects for political 
beliefs. My results show that having just one personal connection who is of a different 
political party can have significant impacts on feelings towards the outgroups, likelihood 
of processing events, and holding political beliefs. Importantly, measuring network 
homogeneity among one’s close associates (with the “important matters” item) does 
capture an influence on political polarization. This provides more evidence regarding 
how researchers measure an individual’s personal networks could influence their 
findings. Finally, these results show that even with high baseline polarization levels, 
homogeneity can increase polarization even further.
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CHAPTER 5 
MAIN DISCUSSION 
How do self-sentiments and discussion networks impact polarization? My 
dissertation tested if self-sentiments and personal networks influence political 
polarization across two experiments. In the first experiment, I tested if self-uncertainty 
and self-affirmation primes would create inauthenticity, which could be reduced by 
affirming an important identity. 
My first study found that that Democrats and Republican participants rated their 
outgroups as less positive, less potent, and less active than their ingroup. This 
demonstrates how political groups do not just dislike each other, but also includes a 
broader polarization that includes rating the outgroup as less potent and less active 
Additionally, participants rated social events as more likely to occur when their ingroup 
was doing a helping behavior and their outgroup doing a bullying behavior. Study 1 
demonstrates that the framework of Affect Control Theory can measure additional 
elements of political polarization. By incorporating EPA and viewing political bias 
towards situations in terms of ACT’s event likelihood, researchers could capture the 
effects of both ingroup favoritism and outgroup dislike in one parsimonious metric.  
Self-affirmation did elevate one’s transient self-evaluation score compared to the 
control group. Additionally, the self-uncertainty condition was significantly lower on 
self-evaluation compared to the self-affirmation condition. The effect was small, but still 
illustrated that self-priming effects could be captured using a new transient self-sentiment 
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measure. However, self-uncertainty did not significantly differ from the control group on 
any self-sentiment dimension. The primes had the strongest effects on self-sentiment 
change when contrasted against each other. Despite weak effects, there was measurable 
self-sentiment change was produced from these primes, allowing this self-priming 
process to be measured in the Affect Control Theory framework. This reveals how both 
self-uncertainty and self-affirmation can be captured in the same metric of self-
evaluation, which provides a more parsimonious explanation of their relationship to the 
self-integrity prime literature.  
The significant distance on the transient self-evaluation dimension between the 
self-uncertainty and self-affirmation conditions suggests that the primes did cause self-
deflection in a predicted manner. Again, the effect was subtle, yet still detectable in the 
self-sentiment measure. While self-uncertainty failed to change self-sentiments 
contrasted against the control, self-uncertainty did produce a significant difference on 
outgroup evaluation contrasted against the control.  
My results only found an effect for the self-uncertainty vs control and self-
uncertainty vs self-affirmation contrasts. In these contrasts, subjects did rate their 
outgroup significantly worse on evaluation in the self-uncertainty group, suggesting that 
the uncertain feeling motivated them to affirm an important identity by derogating an 
outgroup. Despite the self-uncertainty prime not producing a significantly different effect 
in the manipulation check, the outgroup variable was still influenced as predicted. Again, 
these are subtle effects and any significant movement from such strong baseline 
polarization is meaningful.  
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Interestingly, a common manipulation check, the self-integrity scale, did not yield 
a significant difference across conditions. This could suggest that a simpler method of 
self-evaluation could better detect changes from priming effects across self-affirmation as 
well as self-uncertainty. Subsequent analyses also revealed that self-activity acted as a 
moderator for the self-uncertainty prime. This could be because self-activity uniquely 
captures these moderating effects or other sentiments may be involved, but lacked 
statistical power to be detected.  
In summary, it appears that the self-uncertainty prime slightly inflated sentiments 
and the self-affirmation prime slightly elevated sentiments. This slight change in 
sentiments also resulted in significant differences with outgroup evaluation, where the 
self-uncertainty condition rated the outgroup significantly lower on evaluation. Finally, 
transient self-evaluation was a significant mediator between self-uncertainty and 
outgroup evaluation. The self-uncertainty prime did cause significant distance on self-
evaluation compared to the self-affirmation prime, which then resulted in identity 
confirming action (more negatively evaluating the outgroup).  
My first study shows how ACT’s mathematical framework can be used to 
measure political subcultures’ feelings towards their outgroup as well as the likelihood of 
events involving those political groups. This finding alone offers a theoretical bridge for 
American politics to connect to politics outside the United States as a shared metric. 
While the priming effects were small and limited, they still provided some evidence that 
self-integrity primes can influence transient self-sentiments on a new measure. 
Additionally, this mild inauthenticity was found to result in identity confirming behaviors 
(derogating the outgroup in order to elevate self-esteem). This also provides a potential 
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common currency for self-affirmation, self-uncertainty, and self-esteem that can help 
better measure and understand how these processes operate.  
My second study also found that political ingroup members rated their political 
outgroup lower on evaluation, potency, and activity. Additionally, Study 2 found that 
ingroup members rated the likelihood of their ingroup engaging in a helping behavior as 
more likely and the bullying behavior of an outgroup member as more likely.  
It was predicted that ingroup members in homogenous networks would rate their 
ingroups as more positive and potent (suggesting higher warmth and ability to carry out 
goals). My results supported these predictions. Ingroup participants with homogenous 
networks also rated situations where their ingroup was helping as even more likely than 
those without homogeneous networks. Ingroup participants also rated events as more 
likely when the outgroup bullied another person when they had homogenous networks. 
Despite very strong baseline polarization for ingroup and outgroup differences, those 
with homogeneous networks were even more polarized in their negative feelings towards 
the outgroup and the likelihood of those outgroups engaging in behaviors that confirm 
their feelings about them. Network homogeneity can affect how one feels towards 
political groups and then those feelings can influence the subjective likelihood of political 
groups engaging in good or bad behaviors. Finally, network composition was associated 
with higher conservative beliefs among Republicans, but not Democrats (though this 
could be due to a lack of statistical power). As predicted, measuring one’s political 
diversity in one’s personal network through the “important matters” item does capture 
meaningful social relationships and in turn influences political polarization. This provides 
106 
further evidence that how researchers measure personal networks can influence the effect 
network composition can have on belief formation and feelings towards groups.  
In addition to connecting social network composition to Affect Control Theory, 
Study 2 also investigated in how feelings towards political groups impacted political 
beliefs. When Republicans had more positive evaluations of Democrats, they were more 
likely to agree with socialism having merit and climate change being caused by humans. 
When Democrats had higher positive evaluations of Republicans, they were less likely to 
support socialism and believe in climate change. Furthermore, when Republicans had 
more positive evaluations of Democrats, they had less strong conservative beliefs. When 
Democrats had more positive evaluations of Republicans, they had less strong liberal 
beliefs. Outgroup evaluation was found to be a significant mediator between both climate 
change and general ideological belief and network homogeneity. When participants had a 
single close tie that differed in their political ideology, they were more likely to have 
positive feelings towards their outgroup, and also have weaker ideological beliefs.  While 
outgroup evaluation had several significant effects, this was not the case for ingroup 
evaluation. Feelings towards one’s ingroup did not appear to make a difference for the 
ideological beliefs I measured. As other research has shown (Edgell, Gerteis, & 
Hartmann 2006) delineating oneself from their opposing group could also be a way for 
individuals to affirm their own ingroup identity. Thus, one’s feelings towards their 
political outgroup could influence how likely they are to agree with outgroup beliefs 
more than how they feel about their ingroup.  
Study 2’s main conclusion is that having meaningful connections with individuals 
of a different political group can increase positive feelings towards that different group 
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and in turn can also reduce polarization. Social structure influences how we feel about 
certain groups which can also impact what we believe.  
Limitations  
 This project contains several limitations that are important to discuss while 
reflecting on its implications. The samples of Study 1 and Study 2 were both collected 
from Prolific, which is an online population that has issues with generalizability. Also, 
because of the small sample size, meaningful examination of demographic differences 
(such as race, gender, and education) was not possible (see Appendix H). Additionally, 
because Study 1 was conducted online, there may have been distractions occurring during 
the priming that would not occur in a controlled laboratory setting. My hypotheses 
assume the psychological prime is having a proper impact, but if online primes are 
significantly weaker than completing the prime in the laboratory, then this would 
severely limit how primes are influencing self-sentiments. While both self-affirmation 
and self-uncertainty primes have been well-studied in the literature, it is still unknown 
what “dosage” is required to obtain significant effects (such as time spent writing or 
number of words written). Furthermore, my study did not assess if derogating the 
outgroup made my participant’s self-evaluation return to baseline, resolving 
inauthenticity.  
 While Study 2 investigated the relationship between network composition and 
political polarization, it is important to note that these results cannot establish causality. 
While I predicted homogeneity influenced feelings towards political groups, it is possible 
that feelings towards political groups could affect network composition. An experiment 
involving a proxy for homogeneity or a longitudinal study would be necessary to 
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determine causal inference. My results show a significant association between network 
homogeneity and political bias, but future work will need to establish causality. Finally, 
both Study 1 and 2 used behaviors (“bully” and “help”) that focused on the contrast 
between their evaluation dimension. The differences between behavior potency and 
activity may also influence subjective likelihood and this is another avenue for future 
research.  
Future Directions  
My project offers many different pathways for future work involving both self-
sentiments and network composition. Study 1 and 2 created a link with Affect Control 
Theory. Study 1 found a significant contrast on self-sentiments (and subsequent outgroup 
evaluation) between the self-uncertainty and self-affirmation primes. However, future 
research can discover if this was due to having more affective resources to cope with 
disruptive situations or because when people are acting especially good, they are 
compelled to move through the world accordingly.  
Future studies could also dive into how deflection specifically is involved with 
political beliefs. My studies only looked at deflection levels with their association to the 
likelihood of events, but future work could investigate how different identities rate 
different behaviors differently (such as “bully” and “help”) which may influence how 
they process the likelihood of social events as well. Understanding how each group rates 
the components involved would provide even greater precision for predicting how 
individuals process events involving intergroup behavior. Finally, with the dynamic 
properties of identity confirming actions influencing feelings towards outgroups, 
Bayesian ACT could be useful in the future research as well because it could capture the 
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dynamic nature of political identities instead of treating them as fixed points (Schröder, 
Hoey, & Rogers 2016). 
When considering the self-uncertainty and self-affirmation primes, future studies 
should determine what levels of “priming dose” could produce different effects for both 
online and offline samples. Interestingly, the self-integrity manipulation check failed to 
detect differences, but the self-evaluation scale did produce some significant differences. 
A global indicator of self-evaluation may simply be more sensitive to changes in self-
sentiments than trying to detect the nebulous nature of self-integrity. Additionally, self-
affirmation manipulation could create unwanted priming effects (McQueen & Klein 
2006; Schwinghammer, Stapel, & Blanton 2006). Thus, a simpler self-sentiment scale, 
especially when participants are using that same scale to rate other items, could be a 
reliable measure of self-integrity primes.  
After participants derogated their outgroup, Study 1 did not test self-sentiments 
yet again. Three tests of self-sentiments in one short study seemed to risk revealing what 
the experiment was trying to measure. However, future studies can attempt to test if 
inauthenticity is resolved after doing an identity confirming action with clever 
experimental design. Finally, my project suggests self-uncertainty and self-affirmation 
are moving self-sentiments (especially self-evaluation) in opposite directions. However, 
future research can try to provide more support if they are on the same scale and impact 
self-sentiments with the same magnitude. Perhaps self-uncertainty deflates self-
evaluation more than self-affirmation inflates self-evaluation. Due to the subtle nature 
and significant impact of these psychological primes, it is important for researchers to 
measure their processes as accurately as possible.  
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Given how powerful these emotional forces are, it is especially important to 
understand how they interact on the digital landscape with the prevalence of fake news 
and misinformation (Lazer et al 2018). A motivation to derogate the political outgroup 
was found to be a significant reason for sharing fake news online (Osmundsen et al 
2020). Thus, how people feel about themselves could influence how likely they are to 
share fake news online. Additionally, it would be useful for researchers to appreciate the 
possible intersection of cognitive factors such as analytic thinking styles (Pennycook and 
Rand 2018) and cognitive rigidity (Zmigrod 2020) which have been found to influence 
information processing. Future research could investigate how different cognitive factors 
interact with partisan bias and emotions as well.  
How people receive political information from their online networks is another 
important aspect of technology and society. Hampton Shin & Lu (2017) found that 
increased social media use created a spiral of silence where individuals are less likely to 
discuss a certain political issue (government surveillance) offline. Future research could 
investigate whether other political issues operate in the same process. Additionally, Levy 
(2019) found that found Facebook’s algorithm is less likely to share posts from politically 
diverse outlets. Companies have a profit motive to keep their users online, which could 
involve keeping users angry by sharing emotional content with their networks. Thus, 
researchers should also be aware of the macro level processes at the level of the 
institution that can affect the structures of how they receive their information. Social 
factors that influence political bias is of great importance when partisan behavior could 
impede progress for solving national crises. 
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The politically polarized response to Covid-19 provided a recent and salient 
example of how partisans view information differently (and how this could cause harm). 
Research by Gadarian, Goodman, and Pepinsky (2020) showed that Democrats were 
much more likely to take the virus seriously and engage in precautionary behavior than 
Republicans. This is an example of how processing information (i.e. news reports of the 
virus; information from politicians) differently due to political bias can create public 
health problems as well. Unfortunately, this is likely not the last virus or major event that 
requires cooperation between both Democrats and Republicans.    
While tribalism may be part of human nature (Clark et al 2019) and can affect 
how people process identical information (Kahan et al 2017; Alesina, Stantcheva, & Teso 
2018), it is crucial to learn how emotions and network composition influence political 
information processing. How these identities form and influence current emotional states 
can both provide a pathway for understanding the mechanism influencing political bias 
and why individuals process information differently. It is important to understand how 
both discussion networks and emotions fuel political bias as they can each build off each 
other and perpetuate bias.  
Conclusion  
Both self-sentiments and discussion networks have important roles in political 
polarization and information processing. Additionally, these factors were successfully 
applied using Affect Control Theory as a framework. Despite political polarization 
already residing at alarming levels, my research showed how social and psychological 
factors can influence political bias among Democrats and Republicans. Understanding 
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both micro, meso, and macro level forces are important for understanding how 
individuals process information differently.  
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APPENDIX A 
SELF-INTEGRITY PRIMES 
Self-affirmation:  
Pre-test: Participants in the self-affirmation condition will be presented with a list of 11 
nonpolitical values. Next, the participants will be instructed to “pick the one value 
 that is most important to you.” After that, the participants will be instructed to “think 
about a time when your #1 value or characteristic was important to you” and to “write a 
few sentences about a time when this value was important.”  
Study 1 used the following text from Sherman et al 2009 to yield a longer response 
online: “Describe three reasons why your most important value is important to you. Also 
share one example of something you have done that demonstrates its importance.” 
Uncertainty condition:  
Participants will be asked to think about aspects of their life that made them feel 
uncertain about themselves, their lives, and their future. After that, they will be instructed 
to write a few sentences about three aspects that made them feel most uncertain. In the 
control condition, they will write about what they last bought at the grocery store. 
List of values for self-affirmation conditions:
Artistic skills/aesthetic appreciation  
Sense of humor 
Relations with friends/family 
Spontaneity/living life in the moment 
Social Skills 
Athletics  
Musical ability/appreciation 
Physical attractiveness 
Creativity 
Business/managerial skills 
Romantic values 
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APPENDIX B 
SELF-INTEGRITY SCALE 
Self-integrity Scale from Sherman and colleagues (2009) 
______ 1. I have the ability and skills to deal with whatever comes my way. 
______ 2. I feel that I’m basically a moral person. 
______ 3. On the whole, I am a capable person. 
______ 4. I am a good person. 
______ 5. When I think about the future, I’m confident that I can meet the 
challenges that I will face. 
______ 6. I try to do the right thing. 
______ 7. Even though there is always room for self-improvement, I feel a sense 
of completeness about who I fundamentally am. 
______ 8. I am comfortable with who I am 
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APPENDIX C 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
How old are you? 
What race do you identify as? 
What is your gender? 
What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree have 
received? 
What religion are you? (Christian, Jewish, Muslim, nonreligious, other) 
 (for studies 1 and 2) 
In general, how liberal (left-wing) or conservative (right-wing) are you on social issues? 
In general, how liberal (left-wing) or conservative (right-wing) are you on economic 
issues? 
Do you identify as a Republican, Democrat, or other? 
Who did you vote for in the 2016 General Election? 
How important is this political identity to you? 
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APPENDIX D 
SOCIAL EVENT SCENARIOS 
Democrat bullies Republican 
Republican bullies Democrat 
Democrat helps Republican 
Republican helps Democrat 
Democrat helps person 
Republican helps person 
Republican bullies person 
Democrat bullies person 
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APPENDIX E 
PERSONALITY QUESTIONS 
Openness and agreeableness questions from Big Five Short Form test 
“I see myself as someone who…” 
O: Is original, comes up with new ideas  
Values artistic, aesthetic experiences  
Has an active imagination  
A: Is sometimes rude to others  
Has a forgiving nature  
Is considerate and kind to almost everyone 
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APPENDIX F 
SOCIAL NETWORKS QUESTIONS 
 
Please list five people who you discuss important matters with. (name X will be the name 
the participant provides) 
 
How would you describe name X’s political affiliation? Democrat, Republican, 
Independent 
 
How would you describe name X’s political ideology? (Sliding scale on social liberalism 
to conservative and fiscal liberalism to conservatism) 
 
How often do you discuss politics with name X? (almost daily, once a week, once a 
month, less than once a month, never) 
 
How much mutual respect there is between X and yourself when discussing politics? (1-7 
Likert scale from not at all to very much) 
 
 
How often do you talk with name X? (almost daily, once a week, once a month, less than 
once a month) 
 
Does name X know anyone else you listed? If so, who? 
 
What is X’s race and gender? What education level do they have? 
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APPENDIX G 
POLITICAL BELIEF QUESTIONS 
 
Climate change is happening now and driven by human activities 
Some socialist policies offer benefits for our society. 
 
*Likert scale from 1 Strongly agree to 7 Strongly disagree 
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APPENDIX H 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTION RESULTS 
 
Data collection was from the online platform Prolific. Demographic results from 
this online sample were significantly more educated and racially homogenous 
than the American overall population. 
Study 1 Demographics:  
45% Male, 55% female 
Average age = 35.75 (SD = 13.23) 
56% had bachelor’s degrees or higher 
83% white  
Study 2 Demographics:  
51% male, 49% female 
Average age = 37.33 (SD = 12.41) 
60% had bachelor’s degrees or higher 
86% white  
  
